Posted on behalf of Salim Fakirani:

I would like to begin my participation in this e-conference by noting that I am involved in this conference in my personal capacity and not representing the views of my employer or any other organization.

In my opinion, there is no doubt that SSR is relevant and important today. The SSR concept provides a holistic approach to re-building fragile states.   It provides a common understanding/language within donor states for the need of a whole-of-government approach, as well as an international language on which to base joint country assessments and joint planning and programming.   One must recognize that SSR is new, and the focus is on long-term sustainable programming. Therefore, the case studies of Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, should be studied a decade from now to better appreciate reform efforts.   SSR, however, is viewed very much as a Western concept and does not have ownership in the South.   If this does not change, in my view, the concept will lose its importance and relevance.   Although not the direct topic of today, I would like to highlight another area that requires further research and that is SSR sequencing.   The issue of sequencing SSR programming is directly linked to political will in partner countries.   I believe more research is required in this area.

Posted on behalf of  Salim Fakirani:

I would like to acknowledge the excellent papers published for Day 1 of the Conference.   Nicole Ball, a renowned expert in SSR, succinctly captures the origins of SSR and highlights the role of various actors engaged in the SSR process.   Jake Sherman’s paper on the “Global War on Terrorism and its Implications for Security System Reform” provides the reader with a better understanding of reform of the U.S. security architecture following the attacks of September 11th, (for example the creation of the Department of Homeland Security), as well as the Administration’s “militarization of foreign policy”.   Of note, it was important to learn from Jake Sherman’s paper that the “US Government does not have an official definition of SSR, nor a cross-departmental statement of policy.”   The paper, “Why is SSR important? A United Nations Perspective” written by Adedeji Ebo and Kristiana Powell notes that Security Council mandates on SSR has increased significantly in recent years and recognizes the number of UN institutions engaged in SSR activities, including, but not limited to, DPA, DPKO, OHCHR, UNODC, UNIFEM as well as a number of challenges including ensuring national ownership the SSR processes.

Posted on behalf of   Salim Fakirani:

In my opinion, a common theme that emerges in the papers written by Nicole Ball and Jake Sherman concerns the distinctive timeframes in which the SSR concept is engaged. Related to this is the challenge of striking an appropriate balance between efforts to strengthen the ‘traditional’ security architecture of the state and the imperative of developing oversight and governance structures.   The three distinctive time periods are: 1) Cold War; 2) post-Cold War; and 3) Post-September 11th (“War on Terror”).   In this third period, I would concur with the opinion of Jake Sherman that we have witnessed the ‘securitization’ or militarization of SSR; however, I would propose that such is the case in states that are “under fire”.    I do not think we have the information to conclude that such is also the case in developing countries.   Given the importance of the U.S., especially in Afghanistan and Iraq, I suggest that an area where further work is required is the lack of a U.S. policy on SSR.

If we take a long term view of SSR, and we must, it may well be that future SSR activities swing to a focus on oversight and accountability of security institutions when an insurgency, for example, is brought to en an end through political means.   Otherwise, as noted by Jake Sherman, the absence of such oversight eventually results in a loss of legitimacy. This could re-fuel conflict. It remains to be seen whether the new U.S. Administration and its foreign policy focus provides an opportunity to swing the pendulum towards greater efforts for oversight and accountability of security institutions in countries under fire such as Afghanistan and Iraq.

Posted on behalf of  Salim Fakirani:

In general, as we better understand how SSR is operationalized in the field, I would propose that we need to better understand the SSR concept when it is deployed in countries “under fire”, such as Afghanistan, versus SSR processes undertaken in the developing world.   Such an analysis may provide a better framework to understand whether we have seen a ‘securitization of SSR’ or not.   In fact, such an analysis may correctly point to the fact that when SSR processes are undertaken “under fire”, the emphasis on the traditional security institutions where one deploys greater resources at the beginning may be optimal, whereas in developing countries, a focus on the justice sector providing civilian oversight of the traditional security institutions may be more appropriate.

Posted on behalf of  Salim Fakirani:

I would like to highlight additional points that participants at the conference may wish to comment on. First, as was discussed by Walter Slocombe in his keynote address, the international community needs to develop a better systematic evaluation of what SSR reform processes have worked and what has not worked in order to better guide future engagement. On a more basic level I would suggest that there needs to be a greater focus on the term and the definition used for SSR.

The reform process applied to countries whose development is hampered by structural weaknesses in their security and justice sectors and often exacerbated by a lack of democratic oversight is frequently referred to as justice and security sector/system reform or security system reform. Such activities are also sometimes referred to as rule of law or legal and judicial reform. While, in general, the terms address the same issue, each term may reflect a different scope, focus and approach.

In order to ensure appropriate analytical understanding, including joint country strategies and deployments, a common term and definition should be encouraged by countries and international organizations engaged in SSR. For example, the OECD uses the term Security System Reform whereas the UN uses the term Security Sector Reform.  The differences, where they exist, should be highlighted if the terminology is to remain different.

Also, I would add that within the UN system, there is greater work required in ensuring that recent integrated mission mandates that have SSR components recognize the holistic nature of the process.  Such mission mandates should not just the security institutions, but justice, corrections, border management and civilian oversight mechanisms. The UN can play an important role in bridging differences among donor states and create opportunities on the ground for effective SSR programming.

"Why is SSR relevant and important today?"

SSR is an inherent component of building stable, just and economically viable and sustainable societies. As long as the commitment to the provision of human security and development continue to figure prominently on national and international policy agendas, SSR will remain to play a central role in bringing peace, stability, justice and development to transitional and post-conflict societies. The UN’s embrace of the concept, constructive global debates and the interest of regional organizations (e.g. the AU and ECOWAS) to operationalize SSR speak for its increasing relevance – and acceptance.

"Why is SSR relevant and important today?" (continued)

Beyond protecting society from external and internal direct violence, threats and instability, the focus on a population’s entitlement to comprehensive security – the main objective behind human security – requires the security system to work closely with those actors (government, non-government and intergovernmental) that are key players in protecting populations from direct and structural violence. The security sector is part and parcel of a human security provision system. SSR cannot be meaningfully and sustainably achieved outside the framework of cooperative and whole-of-government approaches. We are thus talking about a holistic approach in terms of objectives, tasks and actors.

Without negative peace there is no development; without development no positive peace; without positive peace (i.e. social justice, absence of both direct and structural violence) there is no sustainable human security provision. This of course also means that negative peace facilitates development; development generates stability; and in combination with good governance, positive peace and the mitigation of structural violence are possible. As a result, human security as well as national (regional etc.) security is assured – facilitating continued and sustainable ‘good’ political and security governance. For this to happen, SSR has to assure that actors in the security sector cannot and will not be anything else than a positive force in the realization of these objectives.

"Has the SSR concept veered off course since its emergence in the 1990s?"

The concept has not veered off course, but its implementation has. In the spirit of the UN Secretary-General’s 2008 SSR report and the OECD/DAC approach to link SSR with broader developmental and good governance aspirations and objectives, SSR reaches deep into society, politics and economics. This quality of SSR, inherent in the concept since its inception, remains at its core. The conceptual debate has become more sophisticated, both in academic and policy discourses, embracing holistic, cross-sectoral, and whole-of-government approaches, showing commitment to principles such as local ownership and gender dimensions, and linking security sector governance with broader political, economic and social dimensions of particularly post-conflict and transition societies. However, conceptual evolution and practical implementation do not always go hand in hand. The label “security sector reform” is often used too loosely – for instance, training or modernizing individual security institutions, as stand-alone activities, cannot be called SSR. Or working on the reform of security institutions without developing means and ways to secure parliamentary and civil society oversight is not SSR. Calling such activities SSR betrays the meaning and objective of SSR. Thus, while the SSR concept has seen further sharpening, staying clearly on course, its practical utilization lags behind – and sometimes contradicts – conceptual evolution and progress. However, here, too, positive change is taking place: The fact that the UN has now developed its own coherent approach to SSR, reflecting much of the conceptual progress made during the past years, and that it currently devoted significant effort to mainstreaming SSR throughout the Organization and implementing it in the field, is an extremely encouraging development.

"Have we seen a ‘securitization’ of SSR, moving the concept away from its development roots?"

SSR is a product of positive securitization, broadening the focus of security to integrate political, economic, social as well as military objectives, while deepening its focus by addressing the international, regional, national and individual needs of a diversity of ‘referent objectives’ of security. Only where the concept has been misused or, for instance, efforts at force modernization are confused with broader SSR objectives and activities, have issues that are de-linked from development agendas gained more prominence. Attempts to hijack the SSR agenda to serve primarily traditional military or geo-strategic interests, the increasing privatization of security and conscious efforts at marginalizing the governance dimension of SSR all reduce the non-military dimensions of security and SSR.

Moreover, the general, across-the-board failure of whole-of-government responses to security and development challenges still pushes SSR primarily into the hallways of defence ministries, into the hands of traditional security experts and institutions, while being treated as a ‘dirty word’ by those within the development communities who are not ready to accept the undeniable interdependence of security and development needs and provision.
 
Finally, semantic issues and definitional interpretations play a role: What does the term “security” mean to various actors? Look at the seemingly endless discussions surrounding the concept of human security: narrow interpretations focus on direct violence and threats, broader definitions focus (also) on structural violence and threats. Within each definition, the key security providers vary. If one assumes that security (in its various concoctions) and development are inextricably linked, ‘securitization’ of SSR could well be the ‘human securitization’ (in its broader definition), not militarization, of SSR. This would be a positive development.

I agree with the observation made by Salim Fakirani regarding the necessary distinction between SSR processes that take place 'under fire' and those that do not. Beyond the obvious operational differences inherent to the difficulties of carrying out nation-building activities in the midst of armed conflict, it seems apparent that there is not only a fundamental but -perhaps more importantly- a necessary difference in the approach of SSR adopted for each of the above-named scenarios.

While most literature on SSR calls for a holistic approach to reform processes and often decries the securitization of SSR, the fact that under certain conditions these processes are seen to be more heavily weighted towards traditional security imperatives (conversely, towards development, justice system, civil society engagement, etc) might not be capricious but rather responsive to the realities on the ground. To be sure, the securitization of SSR at early stages of SSR implementation may be necessary, though it need not be permanent. Rather, it can give way to a broader approach to SSR down the line as conditions on the ground permit the involvement of a wider array of actors. 

I would suggest that, from a conceptual perspective, SSR processes can best be understood as a dynamic  continuum, with the state's traditional security architecture on one end (i.e. armed forces) and a much broader range of elements related to the Security Sector (oversight mechanisms, civil society, linkages with the judiciary, etc.) on the other. Thus, with proper sequencing, the reform process can advance gradually from one end to the other as conditions on the ground warrant this movement. Otherwise, if the very possibility of having SSR processes skewed towards hard security requirements at some point of the intervention is outright disregarded, practitioners will have an unnecessary straightjacket and some of their efforts -as holistic as they may be- may prove futile during early stages of intervention.

Please my comments here are personal and does not represent views of my organisation(s). As someone in SSR -Penal Reform in Africa, I must admit that SSR is relevant in Africa particularly conflict/post conflict states. Such reform will assist in laying proper foundation for responsible security institutions, well trained personnels and working policy of international standards. These are clearly lacking in most of our african security services. whether non conflict, post conflict or conflict states.

Beneficiary country's security institutions/personnels should be made to work alongside with  intervening SSR team so that such intervening team should not be considered alien. All sides should be encouraged to bring in inputs and policy framework for implementation. As the beneficiary team are train to take over after intervention.

Like my husband, the facilitator of African Security Sector Lawyers Association  have commented in this conference through his own email, there is the need for an intervening SSR team to first of secure legal agreements or memorandum of understanding with a beneficiary country before implementing SSR.

Such agreements should voluntary bind the beneficiary country to accept  SSR as part of their security Law, enforceable in courts by any aggreived citizen or by international body if breaches occur against the country's citizens.  This will go a long way in checking gradual or later day abuse or descarding of SSR reforms by Governments in such countries, moreso our African Governments and security institutions.

As an academic researcher and practitioner within the Security Sector Reform, I agree with the need for a shift in the security discourse and its debatable framework. However, we have to go further than simply understanding security as multidisciplinary/level study field. Nevertheless, let’s be clear in some respect to an old debate about its framework. 

In an increasingly democratic society which affects diverse areas within the peacebuilding context, the SSR should be a tool to strengthen democratic institutions and their accountability before the citizens. This reinforces the necessity to enlighten that the SSR should strengthen the division of power (expression of accountability) within the process of peacebuilding.

For division of power we must not understand that between local and international actors as it is mostly seen within the peacebuilding. What I mean is a fact I have been observing: the SSR are mainly focused on strengthening political (executive or legislative powers) and military structures. This traditional and non democratic perspective drives the SSR to a death path as it has been showed by many examples of international efforts to reform this sector.

Therefore, the lack of sustainable SSR without having in mind that the judicial system is the third pillar of democracy prompts a failure in the whole effort. To me, the judicial system is the one to judge "individual complains" but also the executive and legislative branch of any state system . 

The complexities of any efforts towards SSR reflect a paradigm of division of power. However, the current traditional understanding of minimum international democratic power forms is harming the SSR process itself. I don’t want to fall in the classical debate about what model of SSR is better but I could say that the post WWII model of security is abide to failure because it is still focused on non democratic power division in an international system which lacks of democratic forms.

Cesar Jaramillo suggests a “dynamic continuum” for SSR, particularly in contexts “under fire”. While I would agree that the sequencing of SSR is vital for its success, I would caution such a formulaic approach. The resources and attention dedicated to a particular aspect of an SSR program, whether its ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ components, should indeed be dictated by the contextual conditions. For instance, in a case experiencing high levels of insecurity from the previous conflict, it is vital that resources are focused on programs aimed at increasing the operational effectiveness of the security forces. However, even at that stage, efforts must be initiated, albeit limited in scope due to resource constraints, to advance the ‘soft’ governance and justice-related aspects of the SSR model. Merely training and equipping the security forces without establishing the foundations of effective and accountable institutions to manage them or the legal framework within which their activities are rooted, can have a corrosive effect on the development of the whole security sector at a formative stage. It could foster a cultural of impunity in the security forces, something that may have existed during or before the previous conflict, and embed other practices and pathologies in the security institutions inimical to the establishment of a democratically accountable and people-centered security sector. Moreover, the very effectiveness of the security forces is itself dependent on the existence of functioning courts and prisons to prosecute and hold offenders as well as competent line security Ministries to provide political direction. What this points to is that while the weighting accorded to different aspects of SSR may change at different stages of the reform process, wholly ignoring critical reform areas can only serve to undermine the process. The bottom line is that a degree of reform simultaneity is required to implement the SSR model as it is currently structured.

I'll be the devil's advocate here and argue that what we are discussing under the banner of SSR is actually what's been the focus of the international community since the end of the Cold War - the reconstruction of states from a (neo)liberal peace perspective - but only under a different disguise. The Afghan experience is a good example of this as therefore, there is no doubt that the concept of SSR has veered off course in the post 9/11 era. What we have in hand right now is a highly 'securitized' version of what has always been presented as 'post-conflict reconstruction' or 'peacebuilding' strategies for war-torn societies over the last 20 years. The methods, actors and programmes are very much the same as before and there have been no major shifts in how they are planned and implemented. The main difference seems to be that now the military being the dominant actor of contemporary 'peacebuilding' experiences, SSR fits well in the expectations of how war-affected societies should emerge from conflict and attempt to recover. Of course, that is always within the contours of liberal peace, which is presented as the only 'menu of the day'. There may be some options in different courses but the menu is still prepared and served by the same people in the same restaurants. In other words, Ball's question of 'whose security' needs proper unpacking  in order to answer the question of where the policy and practice of SSR is going. Otherwise, what we will end up with is the task of coming up with an alternative disguise for future interventions as the experience of Afghanistan and Iraq show that SSR is already facing the danger of becoming irrelevant.

Esther Omolara Ojeah and Manuel Amarilla both raise superb points. Esther speaks of the danger of “intervening” actors being perceived as “alien” in countries undergoing reform? This strikes to the very heart of the issue of ownership in SSR implementation. It is clear that reforms in many countries are still perceived as externally driven not based on partnership and mutually understanding.

Both Esther and Manuel recognize the importance of creating a legal foundation for the process and ensuring that the justice system receives adequate attention and resources. Clearly this has not been the case in so many SSR cases, where justice systems have received a fraction of the resources dedicated to the sector (the bulk going to security force development).

Why do these problems persist for the SSR model, more than 10 years after its emergence?

Though SSR is so important, the origins as described in these papers gives the impression that SSR is a negotiated topic among beligerents or at most a UN imposed concept. Since parties to a conflict (for SSR in post-conflict settings like in the COngo) need to will to commit to the process, it is likely that SSR is to depend on this and that once that agree is gotten with enough commitment, the rest is usually much more of technical process. 

what seems not to have been emphasized adequately is that SSR emerged in the company of such concepts as transitional justice and DDR. In fact, the three concepts emerged as under the rubrique of security reforms but have today grown to be near independent concepts. I guess the reason is that each person tries to enlarge their field of work. In the Congo, efforts have though been made by stakeholders to let the three work in harmony.

As I read these papers, it appears clear that SSR could be just another UN bable whose importance has to be minimized. In post conflict countries, SSR has generally been dictated by the strong/victors and those involved, the orientation given has generally obeyed to other agendas, different from reconstruction and development. In this sense, SSR appears not only to be a western concept, but to be increasingly militarized. 

For ME, SSR is only important if local actors are at the roots, as conceptors and executants. When western "experts" appear to rule the process while local actors are taken to be agents, SSR is but a UN bable

I would also agree that SSR is an important lens for countries living under violent conflict or in a post-conflict stage. My concern is that a top - down approach is unsufficient. Experience has shown that in the short term such approach works, but it is not sustainable in the long term. In this same context, I ask the audience: why not to explore the advances that peace studies and peacebuilding have developed?

Another concern I have is that we haven't heard a voice from the countries recepients of SSR. Do they feel this is an imposition or do they have a voice in shaping SSR programs and initiatives? It seems to me that local initiatives are not considered, moreover, it seems to be considered irrelevant. Although we all can agree that there are not magic recipies for peace and security, we can not deny that local and national efforts are important to consider if we want to have legitimacy and sustainability.

Since the days of the DfID and European SSR blueprints, the initiatives of SSR focused on peace-buildinfg objectives such as economic opportunities and reforms of administration, etc. However, I believe that SSR has had its policy recommendations reduced to 'physical security centredness' and 'quick and dirty' democratisation and liberalisation of market strategies (liberal peace doctrine) in order to improve potential trade relations and have a quick, low-cost and simple exit strategy.

For instance, in Afghanistan, SSR heavily focuses on the professionalisation of the security forces. Hence, the majority of the funding from international donors is on the military. Consequently, the justice sector, led by the Italian government, has poor funds and thus cannot establish a coherent rule of law and justice. In addition, the lack of judicial capacity and poorly trained legal professionals cannot hold former militiamen or security forces accountable for human rights violations, corruption and banditry.

SSR must go beyond military reform as proposed in earlier blueprints during the late 1990s. Contemporary guidelines must be addressed by the international community to put SSR back on track (that liases with the justice sector to build trust, the rule of law and accountability) in order to contribute to the peace-building process effetively.

The problem of ownership in SSR appears to be a recurring theme. I would agree that too often local actors are passive observers in SSR processes. How can this problem be addressed?

Moreover, who are the 'local owners'? Are we speaking of the government, civil society or the general population?

Both Ibrahim Ndzesop and Maria Lucia Zapata highlight -rightly so- the importance that should be given to local actors on the receiving end of SSR processes, since they will ultimately be the ones most affected by the success (or lack thereof) of these efforts. However, while it is true that encouraging local ownership of SSR processes constitutes a fundamental tenet of SSR as currently conceived, we must avoid the conceptual trap of automatically disparaging foreign assistance as it relates to SSR because it is foreign.

Ibrahim Ndzesop suggests that "SSR is only important if local actors are at the roots, as conceptors and executants." Again, while ideally local actors should be at the centre of SSR efforts, in reality this is often not possible as local actors often lack the institutional capacity, logistics, financial and human resources, etc. to be the sole 'conceptors and executants'. In fact, international expertise is often legitimately required precisely because recepient countries lack sufficient local capacity to undertake suck costly endeavors with full autonomy. This said, it is imperative to have local ownership of such processes as a guiding principle and wean recipient countries off foreign assistance gradually insofar as adequate capacity is built locally.

International Security Sector Reform efforts should indeed strive to strike the often difficult balance between providing aid as 'external forces' and encouraging local ownership. Still, even if sometimes misguided in the past (and present) such efforts should be given the benefit of the doubt and should no be outright considered 'UN babble', as Ibrahim Ndzesop has suggested.

Indeed, facilitating local ownership is a fundemental challenge facing SSR today. As rightly pointed out by Cesar, the problem is further excerbated when we consider local capacity in post conflict societies. As also recognised in the OECD Handbook ( 2007), partner governments in post conflict societies lack capacity to design, implement and more importantly, maintain the reform process. How then can the challenge of local building local ownerhsip on the one hand and building local capacity on the other be reconciled?

Mark Sedra raises a good question about the persisting problem of insufficient resource allocation and knowledge transfer to create and foster sound justice systems in countries under going reform.  For my perspective, Nicole Ball, as cited by Alpaslan Ozerdem, drives the point home when she questions “Whose security?” are donor countries concerned with.  The focus on creating a sound legal framework and instilling and nurturing the concept of accountable and transparent governance and oversight, may become secondary, if the donors are more interested in securing certain groups or have a different perspective on what providing security means than the local or national collectives of the country undergoing reform.  The outcome then becomes a disjointed effort where the performance can only look good in terms of statistics, but the realities on the ground may tell a different story.  It may be that SSR will transform into an evolving concept which would almost need to have its own governance and metrics when being implemented, so as to assess if goals are being met and whether sound and sustainable change is being delivered.

Mark: Answering the ownership question, I think it should not be a big concern due to some implications driving to power struggle. As soon as there is an ownership dilemma conflict arises: national vs. foreign, majority vs. minority, etc...

To have a decent right to i.e. human rights, or the "rule of law", (preferring the French literal translation of "State of Rights"), should be universally accepted no matter actors. Unless, we believe that non regulatory frameworks are free of crisis and we prefer interpretauvism or conservative policies of security auto regulation.

However, rather than using classical hot spots, let us try to adopt examples of SSR in transition countries or enlargement processes. Big SSR has been recently adopted by the EU. Is EU a kind of big SSR experiment? Spain, Belgium and recent EU countries are  under SSR programs explicitly or implicitly. But I wonder, why is the European Union requesting their member states to reform their indoor legislations and so adopting massive SSR, to create democratic states based on rule of law and welfare development systems, while some members practice the opposite when foreign commitments? It is paradigmatic that the European Council requires strengthening the civil component on security structures when applying international standards. Why not respecting these standards when developing SSR abroad over focused on military, paramilitary realms?

Well, I have the opinion that foreign policy within the SSR framework is as many other issues, in hands of very traditional and realist perspective. These hands are mastering the issue of development including SSR programs. Therefore, in case of ownership, I would ask to reform our conceptualisation of security or foreign policy as a clear shift.

The current turn of winds within the international political landscape, could add light on this debate. In Kosovo as example, 10 years after intervention, the EU has launched a big super SSR mission called Rule of Law, why now?

Mark raises a very important question in the context of SSR implementation. How do we define local ownership? Although government practitioners try to include local ownership in SSR mechanisms, the reality is that too often principle does not translate into practice. More importantly, getting "local ownership" is further complicated by the different interests within the local population. Local actors can be political elites in the government, or civil society groups - both of which can have very different conceptualizations of what SSR means for a post-conflict country. So maybe an additional question should be can we have SSR and local ownership?  Perhaps we cannot have both.

I agree with Cesar and Zeenia that we cannot reject international assistance just because it is international. In fact, their support is essential especially in immediate humanitarian relief. In addition, I agree that local capacity is diminished by conflict. My invitiation is not to assume that because a country is torned by violence local communities have nothing to say or are doing absolutely nothing. Perhaps they are not very active in the "peace industry" as Roy Licklider would assert, but their developments can not be ignored. Of course, I don´t want to romanticize the role of communities. I acknowledge that there is also a lot of problems in this arena that need to be address.

I think Mark Sedra's question regarding SSR ownership is important. I would add, what is the role of the academe in SSR? I believe that it is important for scholars to get closer to the world of practitioners and to explore the developments that other disiciplines such as peace studies have developed.

Greetings from Afghanistan!

I am very glad that we have finally started these discussions. Indeed, here in Afghanistan, the term SSR is quite new not only among the national athorities but also among internationals working mostly in "non-security" areas.

Ebo and Powell's paper could be quite a useful introductory guide for those interested in learning about SSR. On the question of why we need SSR, let me state that in fragile states and post conflict contexts like Afghanistan where even the basic infrastructure and institutions are either non-existent or extremely weak, and of course because the normal functioning of one area e.g. police is very well dependent/ linked to other areas e.g. governance, eonomic development, often the need for a more holistic and broader approach is crucial.

There should be no doubt about the importance and vitality of SSR especially in the developing world, however, given the complex and quasi-functioning structures and the relative lack of international donor coordination, the key question remains to be how will it actually be translated into effective and acceptable mechanisms to create a more accountable, democratice and sustainable sector. It could be argued that once appreciated and welcomed by all actors (national and international) enaged in the state building, implementation of SSR could very well provide a common ground for various actors to encourage increased collaboration and synergy of resources.     

I believe we can certainly have both SSR and build local ownership of these reform processes. Local ownership should be understood as a pillar of SSR processes, not as a separate framework. Hence they cannot be understood as being mutually exclusive as in an 'either, or' scenario. It is true that encouraging local ownership has often been neglected for the sake of expediency and efficacy. Still, local ownership of a country's Security Sector has to occur at some point if the international community is to disengage from its intervention.

This said, the mere presence of the international community does not ipso facto translate into a lack of local ownership. SSR efforts are lengthy and ongoing and foreign assistance in the implementation of SSR often overlaps with positive developments in local ownership. If one looks for instance at the case of Haiti, the incipient Haitian National Police is neither fully locally 'owned' nor a subject of foreign interveners. Still, the degree to which it has been dependent on foreign training and oversight is not static as has diminished over the years. As the paper by Ebo and Powell and the OECD framework suggest, SSR is relatively recent and the fact that in certain countries local owneship hasn't yet taken hold doesn't mean that it will not in the future. That is, it maye be too soon to make a accurate assessment. In this sense, expectations related to the pacing and sequencing and of SSR must be realistic and observers and practitioners, patient.

In relation to Mark's question of ownership, I must say that it can not be ignored at all. In post conflict environments and aid-dependent countries like Afghanistan, on one hand, due to limited local knowledge and resources, states often fail to take lead in important initiatives such as SSR and so they expect donor interventions, but on the other hand, they often do not appreciate a entirely foreign-driven initiative. Any effort towards nationalization or in the case of Afghanistan "Afghanization" of various internationally driven programs, have however proved effective for the last several years. On the question of who can be the owner of SSR - a more preferred option will be the concerned government. After all, it is the government that is responsible for maintaining strong, effective and sustainable institutions. The government in turn could be made accountable to the civil society, the legislative branch and any other higher authorities such as an Oversight Office. The problem with this option, however is that governments cannot be trusted, at least in the case of fragile states like Afghanistan. Every election and the new governments that emerge as a result of it, for example, can have a drastice impact on the priorities of the previous government. As such, while local ownership must be a key objective, the owner should be determined based on the circumstances and existing structures. One suggestion could be an oversight committee consist of members of different concerned government departments e.g. Defence, Interior, Justice, Intelligence, Civil Soceity, Human Rights....      

Posted on behalf of Dr. RE Poulton of EPES Mandala Consulting Ltd.  

email: repoulton@epesmandala.com 

Security Sector Reform has no single recipe. SSR is country-specific, although it must always include military, police and justice issues, civilian oversight and community governance, management of weapons and explosives and tackling organised crime …

The one constant is this: you cannot achieve SSR with a few projects in three or five years. SSR involves restructuring organs of the State, and this takes a lot of time. Political leaders in a failed state may not even be interested in SSR. It may be an emergency for neighbouring states that are trying to remain stable themselves, however, so heavy external pressure and resources are often critical for SSR success.

In one place the police force may have been destroyed by civil war (as in Cambodia and Liberia). Other countries have an urgent need to restructure the border police: this obviously involves different approaches in a landlocked country like Niger with vast desert borders in the Sahara Desert, compared to Guinea and Somalia which have unprotected coastlines that are open to drug smugglers and pirates.

The so-called ‘War on Terror’ (a title now mercifully abandoned) distorted SSR projects with its focus on military preparedness. The military are self-evidently not the best people to tackle ‘terrorists’ who are more often linked to organised crime than to military matters.

For Afghanistan, President Karzai defined a SSR strategy based on five activities, of which only the first two have made good progress since 2002:
-    Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of armed combatants
-    Restructuring the Ministry of Defence and creating a new Afghan Army
-    Reform and restructuring of the Afghan National Police
-    Counter-narcotics programme
-    Reform of the Justice system

Two points in Ball's paper strike me. First, the fact that SSR is becoming a donor agenda and this is also recognized by key US agencies/departments, indeed, sends a strong signal of an emerging consensus among key actors. 

Second, as an observer in the field, I have always felt an ongoing tension between the development and security actors. For a long time, there has been a relative reluctance between the two groups to work together. However, with the changing dynamics of security in recent years and the decentralized form of insurgency (increaed suicide attacks, IEDs, hit and run, use of civlians as shields by insurgents etc) there is a growing inclination towards a joint and cooperative effort. This is perhaps one reason why the number of civilian advisors/officers is growing in the NATO, US and other military structures.

I completely agree with Qaseem Ludin when it comes to the effectiveness of the SSR strategies implementation being driven by political life cycles.  I would go one step further and suggest that a change in the SSR practices may actually be initiated by the governments to satisfy the public outcry and achieve desired election results.  This is certainly not constructive.  However, the oversight committee consisting of various branches of society could be static and yet positive force to enable continuity.

My question to the group is whether we can / should invest in civil society building and strengthening as part of the SSR process so that we can achieve local ownership and a bridge for continuity of the reform process?

DAY 1 UPDATE (Part 1)

The discussion has been rich and wide ranging. There appears to be general consensus that the SSR concept is useful and important if applied appropriately. However, many commentators have noted that in many cases it has not.  The main themes addressed thus far include:

Local Ownership:

- Numerous participants remarked on the importance of local ownership for the efficacy and viability of SSR. Esther Omolara Ojeah, who works in penal reform in Chad, stressed that  “beneficiary country's security institutions and personnel should be made to work alongside intervening SSR teams so that the intervening team should not be considered alien.”

- Other participants such as Ibrahim Ndzesop, of the Cameroonian Foreign Ministry have emphasized that SSR “has generally been dictated by the strong/victors” and external stakeholders.

- Challenging this notion, Cesar Jaramillo of the University of Waterloo noted that ownership is difficult to establish in post-conflict states when human capacity is limited and civil society fractured, thus there will inevitably be a high degree of external leadership.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER: The debate continues on how ownership should be encouraged in SSR settings and, more fundamentally, who should be the owners?

DAY 1 UPDATE (Part 2)

SSR ‘Securitization’:

- Several contributors have stressed that the SSR process, particularly over the past five years, has become overly ‘securitized’ and militarized.

- As Prof. Alpaslan Ozerdem of the University of York (UK) has stated, “What we have in hand right now is a highly 'securitized' version of what has always been presented as 'post-conflict reconstruction' or 'peacebuilding' strategies for war-torn societies over the last 20 years.”

- Danny Singh, also of the University of York, noted that “SSR must go beyond military reform as proposed in earlier blueprints during the late 1990s.”

- Albrecht Schnabel of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) takes a different approach to the issue of SSR ‘securitization’: “If one assumes that security (in its various concoctions) and development are inextricably linked, ‘securitization’ of SSR could well be the ‘human securitization’ (in its broader definition), not militarization, of SSR. This would be a positive development.”

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER: Is the securitization of SSR a problem? If so, how can it be addressed, particularly in post-conflict states where there is a high degree of insecurity?

I agree with Dr. RE Poulton when he says that there is no particular formula for successful SSR. In each case, different aspects of SSR might be priority, but eventually all parts of SSR must be addressed.

I am particularly inclined to agree with his point that successful SSR takes time. So-called 'white elephant' projects that are short-term and 'look good' cannot and must not be the epitome of SSR from donors. Instead donor countries must take a long term perspective for their commitment to a country, even looking forward a couple of generations. In democracies where the ruling party only stays in power for four years or so, the longevity demands of SSR go against the desires of a political party showing successes while still in power. 

My question is this: How can the longevity demands of SSR be reconciled with the (usually) short-term focus of democratic ruling parties?

Posted on behalf of David Isern :

It is undeniable that local ownership of the SSR process is quintessential for its success, for after all, the efforts are undertaken in order to restore the viability of the state and the security of the individual. The question should therefore not be whether or not to promote it but rather when. The premature involvement of local participation can serve to derail the process as it may result in the targeting of its proponents, may be used as a tool for one group to gain an advantage over another. Equally catastrophic would be a late integration of local ownership for it would serve only to undermine the SSR mission and its credibility.

As mentioned by Cesar Jaramillo, there is a need for a dynamic continuum in which sequencing is used to ensure a gradual progression of the SSR process. Yet there is a need for benchmarks, objectives to mark the completion of one face and signalling the initiation of the next as conditions warrant, as suggested by Mark Sedra. What must not be forgotten is that, as an SSR mission completes its various faces, the process becomes larger and more difficult. For example, after ensuring a basic security environment and perhaps moving to justice reform, the security mission must continue- it does not disappear despite the added justice component that is equally important. As more components are added, the result is a near exponential growth in the challenges facing the governance of the SSR mission. Thus the question of local ownership is, by its very essence, a challenge to said governance for it dilutes the efficiency as described by several colleagues. As those challenges mount the need for an expanded ‘workforce’ will necessitate the participation and promulgation of local ownership- though a challenge this is the lynchpin requirement for the success of SSR. These processes are, of course, not completed overnight and their duration may hamper the amount of political capital or will donated by foreign countries, as pointed out by Jessica Teeple.

For discussing the important issue of local ownership it might be useful to draw a sharper line of distinction between 'SSR activities' and 'SSR assistance activities'. While the first could be used to describe activities led by the country that undergoes reform, the latter would describe activities that external actors undertake in support of the first. 

SSR assistance activities thus require by definition local actors and some form of a local process (SSR activities), which can be more or less inclusive (participatory), transparent, accountable, legal etc. and hence have more or less legitimacy in the population.

A clearer distinction has the advantage of better defining and locating some of the problems associated with SSR and placing the emphasis clearly on where it has to be, namely on the ultimate beneficiaries of reform.

Picking up  on  Jessica Teeple's question, I believe that the answer to longevity demands lies in process, mostly on the side of SSR activities. If this process is well crafted, and SSR assistance activities are designed to support it, then SSR may produce the success needed to convince also successor governments of its usefulness.

I think Arnold's distinction is an excellent one. It is important to note that external actors can play an important role in facilitating the development of a consensus among local stakeholders on "SSR activities". In countries recovering from conflict or in the midst of a transition where the political environment may be polarized and power rleations in flux, the role of constructive third party engagemnt to encourage, and provide space for dialogue and agenda-setting is critical. It is important that external actors avoid gravitating solely to 'like-minded' actors and seek to encourage consensus among a wide range of stakeholders. 

What steps can external actors take to adequately encourage ownership? How can they foster dialogue on an agenda for "SSR activities" without dictating their shape? Moreover, what if the local owners of reform support policies, principles and practices that run contrary to fundamantal SSR principles? In other words what if the imperartive of local ownership conflicts with the SSR normative framework?

Regarding the question about long term processes vs short term focus of democratic ruling parties, I agree that it is important to highligh processes. This also implies a change of mentality. If we continue to operate in a three year project framework, we are not going to reach much progress. Some authors suggest that it is important to start thinking in terms of decades, even generations. Some organizations in Colombia are starting to operate in under this framework.  The question would be whether donors and institutions are ready for such a long-term mentality.

As mentioned by Jessica Teeple, the issue of a longevity focus in SSR practice should be paramount. At the same time, during the Keynote Lecture by Walter Slocombe, an audience member asked the simple yet crucial question of what happens when the international community leaves. Thus, the need for combined local ownership plus a long-term focus becomes apparent within the broader framework of SSR.

To further pursue Mark Sedra's question of whether local ownership may conflict with the SSR normative framework, I would ask the further question of what constitutes the SSR normative framework. How can the pressing need for local ownership be reconciled with the demands of donor countries/organizations?

The issue of the long-term commitment required of SSR processes is indeed highly pertinent to this debate. It is pretty much undisputed that nation-building endeavors in general, and SSR efforts in particular, are likely to take several years -if not decades- to bear fruit. However, the question remains whether any long-term planning will be undermined by the short-term electoral cycles of the liberal democracies that are involved with SSR.

As governments change, so do the priorities, strategies, vision, budgets and even the direction of their foreign policies. Likewise, new governments often entail a change in the key positions tasked with designing, implementing and overseeing foreign involvement in international development and nation-building (eg. Minister or Secretary of State/Foreign Affairs, Minister or Secretary of Defense, Head of Development Agency, etc). Not surprisingly, come election time, several prospective leaders base much of the emphasis of their campaign on promises like 'bring the troops home' or on allocating a significant portion of the budget to different ends.

This is true not only of intervening governments but also of the governments in the countries being intervened. Presumably not all successive governments in these states will be equally receptive to foreign efforts to reform their Security Sector.

Under this conditions, how can the sustainability and continuity of long-term SSR processes be ensured?

Cesar poses an interesting question. We have established throughout this discussion the need for democratic oversight of the SSR process. How then do we establish the longevity of SSR while encouraging the democratic evolution of a fragile state? Perhaps some of the practitioners in our discussion can provide insight into how these two issues can be reconciled or have been reconciled in the past?

In response to Agata’s question, I believe the premier example of SSR occurring in concert with democratization in a state (without the occurrence of a civil war) is South Africa after Apartheid. Indeed SSR fostered the democratic transition in South Africa and it is an example of SSR occurring as part of conflict prevention, rather than as a condition of post-conflict reconstruction. This example suggests that local ownership can occur when fostered by a developing civil society; however, in post-conflict situations without some sort of consensus between belligerent parties, SSR may face similar challenges to the democratization process. These challenges can be exacerbated by the metrics the international donor community use to measure ‘success.’ For example democracy can be measured in votes cast and SSR can be measured in guns collected, neither of which (on their own) will create a long term peace.

e-CONFERENCE DAY 1 SUMMARY, PART 1

We have come to the end of a vibrant first day for the e-conference in which 45 posts were made to the discussion board that was viewed more than 800 times by participants in 40 countries.

The following is a summary of some of the main points raised during Day 1 of the e-conference:

Ownership

The issue that most preoccupied the participants was the dilemma of local ownership. It was recognized as a key to the success of the process, but also a frequent casualty of implementation. Many participants decried the failure of external actors to properly nurture local ownership, while others questioned the viability of local ownership in transition societies facing deep political divisions and acute capacity shortfalls. Arnold Luethold of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) called for the disaggregation of the SSR concept, which acknowledges that there are both “SSR activities” owned and led by local actors and “SSR assistance” provided by external actors. While this analytical approach does not solve many outstanding questions about the challenge of reform ownership, it provides a superb launching pad for the continuation of this debate on Day 5 of the e-Conference when Eirin Mobekk’s paper on SSR & the Challenge of Local Ownership will be featured.

Reform Balance & ‘Securitization’

The holistic nature of the SSR process was also an issue that was the subject of much discussion. Several participants with experience in the field emphasized the disproportionate level of assistance typically provided to ‘traditional’ security structures, such as the military and police, as compared to governance and justice institutions. This reflected, in the opinion of some participants, a continued securitization/militarization of the process that has threatens its fundamental principles.

e-CONFERENCE DAY 1 SUMMARY, PART 2

The SSR Life Cycle

The “life cycle” of the SSR model was another theme that emerged. Several participants emphasized the long-term nature of the process and the futility of short-term approaches. As Robin Poulton of EPES Mandala Consulting Ltd. stated, “You cannot achieve SSR with a few projects in three or five years…it involves restructuring organs of the state, and this takes a lot of time.” Related to the issue of timelines is the imperative of sequencing. Cesar Jaramillo asserted that SSR should be conceptualized as a continuum in which the prioritization of reforms is determined by contextual conditions. While there was some support for the notion, Mark Sedra cautioned against a tiered or fragmented approach that could embed damaging patterns in the sector and fail to acknowledge the interconnected, mutually reinforcing nature of reforms.

LOOKING FORWARD TO DAY 2

On Day 2 the discussion will shift to Donor Approaches to SSR. Among the questions that we hope to address are:

•    What are some of the dominant approaches to SSR and which have been the most effective?

•    Is there a need to reach an international consensus on the shape of the SSR model and how would you achieve it?

•    What role should international and regional organizations such as the UN and the African Union play in SSR?

•    Have donor states been able to advance integrated, whole-of-government solutions to SSR challenges? Why is this important?