Post on behalf of Rory Keane of The International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), OECD Development Co-operation Directorate

Donor Approaches to SSR – The frontier questions

Significant progress has been made in recent years in both developing and implementing the concept of SSR. Without listing the milestones in this journey, it is enough to say that the journey has delivered a growing donor technical capacity and measurable results on the ground. This technical development is to be welcomed and further supported. However, there are other aspects of the SSR agenda that also warrant close inspection by donors at this juncture. Firstly, on the conceptual level, greater effort needs to be made to bring security focused policy communities and justice focused policy communities together in a more coherent fashion. Despite the fact that the OECD DAC guidelines on SSR explore issues of security and justice together, donor policy communities remain to some degree locked within their respective thematic invisible cages, which makes coherence, coordination and complementarity all the more difficult to achieve. Another major challenge facing SSR is the question of local ownership. Frankly speaking, we all need to do a much better job in understanding what local ownership for SSR actually means and how best it can be supported and operationalised. In this respect further donor introspection is required so as to assess how best to respond to the local context, how best to develop equal relationships with partners and how best to align donor support to local processes. I am hopeful that this online e- conference – bringing together those that think, work and advocate on SSR from the North and the South – can help uncover a path that helps to navigate and explore such frontier questions. 

Dear all, "another frontier question"

In addition to my comment above, the other critical frontier question to be addressed is the future role of non-state actors, as critiqued in the paper by Bruce Baker "The Future of SSR". In this regard, I would like to alert e-conference participants to an OECD PDG-Africa Development Bank conference that will take place in Tunis on 8-9 June 2009. While the conference looks specifically at CONTRACTING OUT CORE GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS AND SERVICES, one of the conference panels is being co-supported by INCAF and will address the question of security and justice service provision in fragile and conflict situations.

In tackling the question of security and justice delivery from outside, it is recognised that service provision by "outside" non-state private actors goes to the heart of the state sovereignty debate and legitimately explains why partner countries are often hesitant to outsource the provision of security and justice services to private actors.

While some argue that such interventions could have an in-built tendency to undermine ownership and to fuel dependency, greater efforts to ‘regulate’ the provision of security and justice by outside non-state private actors and more effective compliance with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness could potentially counteract such a tendency (for discussion)?

Moreover, "alternatives to contracting out", such as working more effectively with local/indigenous non-state providers of security and justice provides a possible emerging option - if not an alternative - to contracting out to the private sector? The security and justice panel at the Tunis conference will address these issues in detail and hopefully provide insight on how donors and partner governments can work more effectively with local non-state providers of security and justice.  

Rory Keane submits that the concept of SSR has advanced in measurable ways in recent years. However, he states, donors need to inspect certain aspects of the SSR agenda before advancing further. He argues that first, donor communities are hindered by their own ‘thematic invisible cages’ making it difficult to coordinate with each other. Keane also highlights how donors need to better understand local ownership, asking the question “how best to develop equal relationships with partners and how best to align donor support to local processes?”

Should international and regional organizations such as the UN, African Union, and European Union work towards a greater consensus, thus breaking down the ‘thematic invisible cages’ that hinder donor communities? If not, who is responsible?

Keane also raises the issue of non-state actors and their role in providing security and justice in SSR. What “‘alternatives to contracting out’, such as working more effectively with local/indigenous non-state providers of security and justice provides a possible emerging option - if not an alternative - to contracting out to the private sector?”

Posted on behalf of Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Head of the Centre for European Peace and Security Studies at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy in the University of Hamburg (IFSH)

There are different donor approaches to SSR due to what can be called differing political SSR cultures or learning processes. They relate to SSR core concepts, guidelines, priority sectors, mechanisms and/or modalities. Which of these different approaches have been most effective is hard to determine. One can speculate that those donors who base their policy on detailed policy guidelines and use their SSR concepts in a self-critical way will be more successful in the end.

There should be an enhanced international consensus on the main features of SSR. The OECD Handbook on Security System Reform is good starting point. Nevertheless there exists much confusion when it comes to implementing SSR. This is partially due to differing interests and interpretations and partially a result of the sheer complexity of the ever-growing SSR agenda following the 3-D approach.
 
On the one hand, this development towards more complexity makes it necessary for national donors to specialise. On the other hand, international organizations such as the UN or OECD, and regional organizations such as the African Union should play an increasing role in terms of coordinating national SSR activities and joint concept development. These organizations should provide a framework for a modularised whole of government approach. This approach is essential because it will enhance SSR effectiveness and strengthen the link between security and development. However, the related governance task should not be underestimated.

I would like to pick up on Rory Keane's earlier comment about the ''separation'' between SSR and RoL communities, in particular in donor agencies/ministries. Sadly this seems all too true. Two questions are pertinent in my view:

1. Is there a real difference between the concepts of SSR and RoL, or are the essentially about the same processes, actors and purposes albeit with a different focus?

2. How can, pragmatically, these communities be brought much closer or even merged? What are there respective drivers and interests and how might they be best stimulated to ever closer cooperation. Can, maybe, existing UN and OECD fora be used for this purpose?

Permit me an attempt to also take a stab at some provisory answers, entirely from my point of view of course: the difference between the RoL and SSR is often depicted as two circles that overlap and have the police and criminal justice at their center. RoL then includes the legal system, access to justice issues etc, SSR focuses on the military and intelligence etc. Personally, I don't buy this distinction. At the heart of both concepts are governance questions that have to do with the provision of security and justice, and the climate that is required/can be created as a result of their adequate provision.

It seems to be that the differentation between RoL focus on ''softer'' issues like access, gender, justice etc. and SSR focus on institutions and ''harder'' issues like the military is largely self imposed. Both concepts look at security & justice from both a governance, and a substantive (capability) viewpoint. Provokingly I am tempted to suggest that these communities could be merged fairly immediately and in this way remove another obstacle to effective cooperation within donor organizations.

Why is a broader definition of SSR (one that includes aspects of rule of law) beneficial to states on the receiving end of SSR? What is a good example of a state that could have benefited from the implementation of a 'broad' SSR?

Posted by Babacar DIOUF, SENEGAL

Directly or through the people from sub regional organizations like ECOWAS, the <african <union can play a key role in the local ownership dimension; it should also be associated to the coordination as a stakeholder whose mediation will make the process less alien and less externally imposed. Hence, it becomes the first partner to get in. Of course, the other partners should have a say in the selection of countries contributing to teams. Indeed, it is very important to look into the police, military (... etc.) culture of those people, who will need to be credidible (not just say "do as I say and not as we do in my country).

Let me seize on another of Rory Keane’s superb frontier questions, the role of non-state actors in SSR. I would tend to support Bruce Baker’s contention that “the future is non-state”. I would like to focus specifically on the role of informal/traditional security and justice actors in SSR settings. Please note that on Day 4, the e-Conference will feature a paper on “SSR and the Private Sector” by Alex Martin and Peter Wilson of the Libra Group. 

In post-conflict and fragile states the reality is that informal/customary justice and security structures tend to be viewed by the majority of the local population as more accessible, effective, affordable and attuned to local realities than their formal state equivalents. Despite their public legitimacy, SSR programs tend to advance their deconstruction in favour of formal state structures. Informal bodies tend are characteristically viewed by the process as a competitor, rather than a complement to formal bodies.

In Afghanistan, it is widely recognized that more than 80% of all disputes are resolved through informal mechanisms, many of which are not wholly incompatible with the constitution and international human rights norms. Yet almost all assistance to the justice sector has been funneled to the formal justice system, which the majority of Afghans view as corrupt and out of touch. Only recently have some small initiatives been launched to explore avenues for the formation of a complimentary relationship between the formal and informal justice systems. This should have been happening from the beginning of the process.

Here is my challenge to our participants: How can donors effectively discard their formal institutional bias and better support informal structures in the context of SSR? 

I think Babacar Diouf raises a critical point about working through regional organizations. More fundamentally, I think it is vital to take a more regional approach to SSR.

Let me pose another question that is relatively straightforward, with no simple answers: How can donor states better support the work of regional organizations like ECOWAS and the AU?

I think engaging regional organizations in the SSR process goes back to the importance of local ownership which was discussed at length yesterday - perhaps regional organizations would indeed be better suited to implementing more sustainable reform processes.

Yet could this run into the same problems as engaging civil society or local actors in SSR? Would donor countries be willing to forego some semblance of control to regional organizations? Would multilateral organizations, infamous for their slow pace of reform, be willing to take a back seat?

There is no doubt in my mind that regional organizations are crucial in the SSR process, yet the logistical question of how they and donor states can work together is indeed a complicated one.

I would make two points, one with respect to rule of law, and one with respect to non-state actors.

First, with respect to rule of law. If you endorse the UN definition of rule of law, which the U.S. Government, the European Union, and the OECD all have, than rule of law becomes the overall framework within which SSR, as well as almost every other component of reconstruction and stabilization, go forward.  The rule of law framework becomes the "rules of the road," if you will, while SSR provides the Drivers' training program. 

With respect to non-state actors in the security sector:  one of the stated objectives of SSR, as it has emerged within the UN and international community, is to restore the state monopoly on the legitimate use of coercive force.  I would be very cautious about partnering with non-state actors in SSR, most obviously because they undermine that monopoly, even with the most benign activities and the best of intentions.  They lack accountability to the mechanisms of governance, and typically lack enforceable, well-understoond standards for the use of force in the course of providing security goods and services.

I would also beware of assuming that local traditional and customary actors have legitimacy: some do, and  some don't.  Where local populations are not homogenous (true of almost every area these days, even remote villages in Liberia), endorsing local, customary bodies may advantage one ethnic or religious group over another. Where there is a history of intra-communal violence, they may perpetuate that violence and make restoration of state authority more problematic.

I do not mean to overstate this. There are freq

The relationship between state and non-state actors seems to be quite crucial not only in terms of conflict, but also in terms of democracy development. In most of the cases the institutional capabilities are so weak, that states haven't the capacity to really undertake a seris program without external (non-state) help. SSR developments could work on:

- The integration of state and non-state actors in the programs. There is a tendency to work with governments. Donors could, for example, generate regional or even national dialogues with non-state actors, have feedback from them about the governmental programs. Working with non-state actors is hard if donors don't work on medium-long term programmes or if requisites are too high (or comparable to the possibilities of a state).

- SSR efforts should consider that democratization is a long-term effort, and actors like security forces have been in the center of authoritarianism. The inclusion of non-state actors makes a linkage with a society that may fear or distrust the developments driven only by governments which rearely control or conduct the armed and security forces.

On the other hand, I found the "less post-conflict" approach very refreshing, it made me think on the different contexts, and how SSR developments have had difficulties to generate lasting and non "suspicious" programs in regions like latin america. Working with more developed countries can generate the spread of ideas and experiences, it generates a framework that may help to contain the post-conflict cases in a region (like it has been seen for some years in the Haiti-latin american relationship). These "more developed" countries use to also have some experience in the relationship state/non-state.

Thomas Dempsey is right that we should not romanticize informal/traditional security structures and norms. Moreover, he is correct to say that at the very core of the SSR model is the imperative of restoring a state monopoly of violence. However, I would also say that we should not overstate the ability of the donor community to implant formal security structures in transition societies. If donors are to work with, and not around the local context, they must engage existing security and justice systems. We must move away from the blank slate mentality. If the SSR model is too rigid to recognize this, it should be re-conceptualized.

Let me say, however, that I don't think that the goal of creating a monopoly on the legitimate use of force is incompatible with the empowerment of non-state security/justice structures. In the case of the latter, the goal should be to foster a relationship of complementarity between the state and the non-state, ensuring that the non-state adheres to fundamental standards of human rights. They would not be completely autonomous from the state but working in concert with it to increase public access to security and justice services.

The issue of Security Sector Reform vs. Rule of Law is understabdibly contentious as it relates to SSR as a whole. That is, RoL should be an integral component of SSR as presently conceived, especially given the 'holistic' or 'whole of government' approach that should inform these processes. However, I believe that the problem lies, from the perspective of donor governments, in that there is still a significant discrepancy between the theoretical framework (such as that proposed by the OECD DAC Guidelines) and the practical implementation of SSR.

That is, the literature on the subject seems to have advanced at a faster pace than the institutional and organizational capacity of donor governments to bring together in a coherent manner the agencies and donor communities tasked with security-related issues on the one hand, and governance-related issues on the other. In this scenario each of these communities in the donor countries lag behind the unified approach that informs the most current SSR guidelines.

I would expect to see in the near future the development of more agencies and departments in donor countries that are wholly devoted to and tasked specifically with SSR in a multidimensional fashion that brings together practitioners and experts from both security and governance issues, thus taking them out of their respective 'thematic cages' as Rory Keane has aptly called them. What we have today, on the contrary, are separate agencies/ departments, with different organizational cultures, different budget allocations, and so on, working separately on different fronts (ie. security and governance) hoping to achieve broader SSR objectives, rather than working together in a concerted effort to achieve these ends.

Posted on behalf of Babacar Diouf :

Non state actors and SSR

(I apologize for my last editing : quite unclear). This is the correct text.

Did I get Bruce Baker right on the issue of Non state actors ? If yes, I am puzzled. Indeed, Mafia may seem functional when it takes care of cases of no interest for States” (a widow being evicted from a house because she could no longer pay the rent) as wrote an author. Yet, does this make Mafia an organization for an official to wilfully work with? I don’t think so. When States are so weak that they no longer have the monopoly of violence, survival strategies may bring in other types of organizations. True, but this does certainly not turn them into legitimate actors in a SSR, particularly in places where democracy is at best still an implant. I suggest to be careful.  In my view, non state actors may exceptionally be partners in SSR, but as temporary ones and if we are able to anchor them to the rule of law, the respect of human rights and accountability. Otherwise, such a deal with the Devil may come back to haunt us for a long time because of its implications in the eyes and mind of the populations.

Goor and Veen in "The future of SSR" present two new arguments: First, SSR should be applied/implemented in regular developing countries which are  secure as opposed to post-conflict settings. It is argued that regular developing countries have better organized and mature political systems in place and thus they offer a better chance for political dialogues than post-conflict countries. This notion takes us back to the original question raised yesterday of whose security. It also leads one to think of the original rationale for inventing this concept - to consolidate the support provided to security sector. If SSR is not the right prescription for post conflict and fragile states where the risks of returning to violence are often greater and security becomes the precondition for any form of intervention, then what is it good for? If its purpose is comprehensive approach and consolidation of support for the security sector, it is a best approach for post-conflict environments.  Field experiences have shown that enormous amount of resources can be wasted in the absence of a better coordination at time of distribution. Often countries with weak regimes and inefficient rule of law, get more assistance than they need, but they fail to make effective use of them.  

The other question regarding the above notion is the criteria or prerequisites for applying the lessons of SSR. How would one measure that a country e.g. Nigeria has the right conditions for SSR application? Also, what about funding? There is a general consensus in the papers on SSR that Security and justice sectors are relatively under-funded. What about the question of political will and history of the "regular" country? What would be the purpose of SSR implemention if security isn't a big problem for states?

To continue my post on SSR and non-state actors (I apologize for being too "long winded"). I agree completely with Mark Sendra's comments, and don't want to overstate my reservations about non-state actors.  Collaborating with such actors can yield critical short-term benefits, especially for external military forces intervening in complex and violence-prone nations.  When it is necessary to partner with local non-state actors as security providers, SSR planners must take care to analyze both the advantages and disadvantages of such collaboration, and should seek measures to mitigate potential negative affects on state legitimacy and functionality.

Qaseem's comment is an insightful one. SSR, at core, is about legitimacy, making host nation ownership and "buy in" critically important to realizing successful outcomes. This creates a real conundrum:  the host nation governments most in need of SSR (like Nigeria) are going to be reluctant to accept programs that are inherently critical of governance and service delivery in the security sector. This is especially true of host nations confronting internal challenges to government authority and legitimacy.  I would be very interested in the thoughts of the group on how you "sell" a genuinely transformative SSR agenda to a nation like Nigeria.

I would like to remark on two of the themes that seem to be running through today's discussion. Many participants have expressed concerns about integration and sustainability/longevity of SSR and RoL initiatives. I agree that there appears to be a substantial gap between theory and practice in these regards. What obstacles does the donor community face in closing these gaps?

I believe that two processess require further attention before sufficent progress can be made towards increased SSR integration and sustainability. They are: national/organizational branding of SSR initiatives, and organizational competition for donor funding. How do these processes influence the gap between the desired implementation of SSR, and implementation in practice? What other obstacles can be identified? How can the  negative effects of these obstacles be mitigated?

Perhaps, the reason why SSR hasn't been successful after its application for many years, is not necessarily because it was applied in post-conflict settings, but perhaps it was not "rightly" applied. After over 15 years of its use in various contexts, today we find that SSR objectives aren't clear, or its "Whole Government Approach" is not feasible. The question is has SSR been properly applied yet. Do all donors understand SSR principles? Have all donors viewed and treated security and justice related projects that are funded at various government minitries the same? Similarly, has there been a balanced distribution of resources to reflect SSR goal? Perhaps it is less to blame SSR as failure, but more to blame ourselves for not thoroughly applying it.   

Reaction to posts # 16 and # 18.

I would like to offer the following thoughts:

1. The argument in Luc's and my paper was not so much that SSR is not relevant or should not focus on post-conflict environments, it merely wanted to point out that more ''regular'' development settings can be more productive to SSR and certainly have received little attention so far. This combination can make more donor focus quite attractive.

2. With regard to Thomas Dempsey's excellent point on how to best ''sell'' an SSR program to a country like Nigeria, I think I would advocate a pratical strategy. Pick a topic or issue that matters to them, that they require external assistance with and just do it. Of course it needs to be an issue that potentially provides linkage to a broader and more transformative agenda. But that does not have to be the start at all. In this context I would also point at the inception phase approach in earlier research by Nicole Ball and Luc van de Goor (from project to program) where the importance of creating entry points and building credibility is argued. Several participants have pointed to the long term nature of SSR processes. This is perfectly in line with beginning with modest projects that matter pratically and tangibly to the recipient government. Over time, one needs to work on these projects leading to more substantial and meaningful (from a transformational point of view) engagement. Sometimes that will fail, sometimes it might succeed. Much will certainly depend on the quality of field personnel.

Thomas Dempsey is right to point out that developing countries such as Nigeria might be reluctant to accept an SSR agenda that is inherently critical of their security architecture and governance structures. In other words, the fundamental underlying assumption of SSR processes -as self-evident as it may be- is that the Security Sector of a given nation needs to be reformed. 

This begs the question: the Security Sector needs to be reformed according to whom? 

If the host government accepts an SSR agenda with the intervention of the international community, it is implicitly admitting the shortcomings of the Security Sector that need to be addressed. If, on the contrary, the host governement is unwilling to accept the need for SSR processes, then, SSR will not occur, lest it be seen as a foreign imposition, with the implications for national soverignty that this entails.

In short, the acquiensence of host governments is a necessary condition for the effective implementation of SSR.

This relates to yesterday's discussion regarding the necessary long-term nature of these transformative processes and the possibility that not all successive governments in the host nation are equally open to donor countries 'meddling' with their Security Sector. This leads to a peculiar paradox: Could democratic practices in the intervened countries (as politically incorrect as it may sound) hamper long-term SSR planning and efforts from the donor community? Could these goals be better served by a stable yet autocratic regime that is receptive to the conditions of foreign involvement over time and thus ensures the continuity of donor country initiatives?

I think that SSR is broader than Rule of Law. Security and rule of law are two different things both of which fall under the definition of SSR.

Following Mark Sedra's question about donors and the support of informal structures in the context of SSR, there are a number of intersting experiences especially in community justice in latinamerica that are worthwhile to analyze. It has been an process of mutal education and communication between donors, governments, NGOs, and communities.

Qaseem raises an excellent point, as it succinctly sums up some of today's a yesterday's debates on the conceptual scope of SSR. There is pehaps a tendency to disaggregate the concept of SSR into its essential elements and pose questions like: can we have SSR and local ownership? can we have SSR and Rule of Law? These questions would suggest that SSR and RoL, or SSR and justice reform are two comparable, competing frameworks, when they are not. Like Qaseem has pointed out, these are elements contained in the very definition of SSR.

Rule of law by its broadly accepted definition is a principle under which all persons, institutions, and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and that are consistent with international human rights principles.  As is evident from this definition, the rule of law framework establishes the context in which SSR goes forward:  it provides the foundation upon which security institutions, including law enforcement, justice administration, courts, prisons, military forces, and the ministries that oversee and manage them, are built and operate.  Seeing SSR as a subset of rule of law turns this relationship on its head. The rule of law framework- including, for example, a national constitution and appropriate legislation giving force to that constitution- must drive SSR, else legitimacy becomes meaningless.

Cesar, I agree with you. SSR and Rule of Law should not be two competing frameworks and theoretically they are not. However, the problem is that SSR as a concept includes so many different facets of reform that, in practice, the implementation often depends on priorities from competing donors for instance. This occurs in South Sudan, where there is a joint donor office based in Juba coordinating all funding activities. The problem is that donor funding is primarily for the reform of the SPLA. Reform of the judiciary, police, and/or the prison systems are not well integrated in the overall SSR strategy. Unfortunately, these areas, which are a main part of SSR, are under-funded.

Qaseem may be right that many of the failings of SSR are caused by the driver (the donors), not the vehicle itself (the SSR model). However I do believe that there is a need for some work under the hood. In the major SSR conceptual frameworks (the OECD DAC & UNSG Report), I don't believe there is enough guidance on how to deal with a number of issues, such as non-state actors and the private sector.

Another issue that has not received a great deal of attention in today's discussion is the need for whole-of-government (WoG) donor approaches. The diverse nature of the SSR project demands a joined-up approach by donors. Few have achieved this in practice and I know of no donors that have an explicit WoG strategy for SSR. The Canadian and U.S. governments have been developing such strategies but they have not been released. In his remarks, Robert Perito (see video) speaks of the difficulties in the U.S. to develop a common SSR framework.

The lack of U.S. buy-in into the SSR normative framework to date, as seen in their provision of security assistance to Afghanistan and Iraq, presents a major problem. It reflects the need to find an international consensus on key aspects of the model (beyond the name - Security Sector Reform vs. Security System Reform). Achieving this consensus may require even more robust leadership from actors like the OECD DAC and UN or key donors like the US and UK.

A recurring theme appears to be whether, from a definitional and practical perspective, SSR in fact encompasses other related elements beyond those related to security such as the judiciary, prison system, rule of law, encouraging local ownership, etc. While on the one hand there seems to be consensus on a broad, wide-ranging definition of SSR like that of the OECD DAC Guidelines, on the other we see that in practice the efforts to implement the different aspects of SSR are often uncoordinated, fragmented and unevenly funded.

At the risk of sounding repetitive, I would like to reiterate an earlier point: Perhaps the explanation for this apparent contradiction is that there is a gap between the most current guidelines for SSR and its actual implementation on the ground. That is, the question is not only what should SSR entail but also how it it is currently being implemented and how can donor countries and agencies involved with SSR better coordinate their efforts in a coherent approach?  

I would ask participants to comment on how this gap between theoretical formulations and practical implementation of SSR can best be closed by donor countries.  

I agree with Mark Sedra that greater emphasis is required by donor governments to developing whole-of-government SSR strategy - such a strategy should ensure that the appropriate roles and responsibilites are clearly articulated between the various actors involved - not only defence, diplomacy and development, but also justice, border, corrections etc.  Incentives for cooperation and coherence of the different actors would be required for the strategy to succeed.   Significantly, individual donor strategies need fit within an international country strategy with numerous donors.  Duplication of efforts on the ground should be avoided as best as possible -- a "whole-of-system" approach is required on the ground.

On state and non-state actors

After having read the discussion of state- vs. non-state actors, I would like to add that the picture on the ground sometimes looks more nuanced than the simple opposition suggests. Some individuals and groups fall in a third category as they behave sometimes as state- and sometimes as non-state actors, and sometimes  as both simultaneously. While Hamas and Hizbullah are good examples to illustrate this,  many others examples exist within and outside the Arab region. To a fourth category I would count  the mock state-actors who claim to be  state-actors, but  de facto behave as non-state actors; they operate outside the legal framework and escape governmental and parliamentary control, but get some form of acceptance and recognition through relationships and, in some cases, even through donor support.  SSR assistance in weak/fragile states  may make it necessary to revisit some of the assumptions on state- and non-state actors.

Salim Fakirani and Mark Sedra rightly point out to the need of donor governments to develop a well-structured whole-of-government approach to SSR processes so that the efforts by the various actos involved are better integrated and coordinated. Such coordination is required not only among the different agencies that operate within individual governments, but also among the various governments that jointly undertake SSR endeavors.

While there is an aknowledgement that this need exists, less has been said about how to achieve consensus on a given framework and unify operational strategies. If each government takes the initiative to develop such a framework there is the risk of ending up with different, perhaps conflicting approaches to SSR. The alternative would be to expect leading actors like the OECD, UN and individual governments to define and refine their SSR strategies and hope to gain a consensus around them.

What to do? How can a framework that provides guidance on the intricacies of the different scenarios that have been mentioned here today and addresses the constraints not specifically included in previous guidelines be constructed? How to ensure that donor countries abide by a unified framework?  

On the role of regional and subregional organizations

While I agree with those who wish to see regional and subregional organizations play a greater role in SSR, I doubt that these will be able to play a coordinating role for SSR activities. The reason is simple:  SSR remains largely a state-centric concept and regional and subregional organizations tend to invoke the principle of non-interference and its correlated concept of state-sovereignty when asked to take collective action.

Such organizations can however make  important contributions at various other levels: setting and promoting acceptance for standards of good governance and defence (civil supremacy, oversight,  etc); ensuring that regional directives are incorporated into national legislation; defining supranational security strategies, which provide guidance for national security strategies and ensure leverage of limited ressources;  encouraging the establishing of transparency building mechanisms at subregional and regional level;  monitoring human security indicators across the region/subregion; developing training support capacities and advisory capacities for international SSR assistance to the region   etc.

Early in today’s discussion the concept of regional actors being employed to facilitate SSR was discussed, several posts stated that regional organizations (such as ECOWAS or AU) could help developing countries institute SSR programmes. These programmes would indeed gain ‘regional’ ownership; however, such a relationship would not necessarily build ‘national’ or ‘local’ ownership. Such a relationship continues to rely on direction or assistance being given to a developing state from a group of ‘outside’ states, how does this differ from assistance provided by the international donor community? Regional bodies may lack the unseemly colonial history of the West; however, contemporary geopolitical frictions may limit cooperation in SSR programmes (in the Great Lakes region for example). If a country is unwilling to begin SSR, then prompting or even coercion by the international community (either by regional organizations or the donor community) may lead to programmes devoid of local ownership.

My comments will be on two things:

1. Non state actors. While I agree that non state actors have played a big role in providing secirity in the past, it appears that since SSR is about building a robust and accountable sucurity sector, non state actors may play a vital role at the beginning of SSR, but their service is likely to give way to formal structures when SSR goes full scale. In addition, donor support for non-state actors is not well percieved by governments, even democratic ones. In this regard, the future is likely not to belong to non-state actors. Donors even sometimes promote non-state actors to levels never acheived in their own countries. Irealistic!

2. on multiplicity of donor strategies, may I say that on issues such as DDR, the integrated model promotted by the UN expressly requires that there be asingle national coordination under the government and that all donor strategies be channeled through this unit. SSR has to follow the same model, though there is a marked gad between theory and practice as Fakirani mentioned. In other words, not only would governments of specific countries need a common approach, there also has to be one strategy in the recipient state.

e-CONFERENCE DAY TWO SUMMARY, PART ONE

Today the e-Conference looked at donor approaches to SSR and the ways in which donors can effectively interact with regional organizations, non-state actors, and recipient governments to advance the implementation of reforms

The major themes addressed included:

Regional Actors

There was a consensus that greater effort must be made by key SSR donors to work with and empower regional organizations to engage in SSR effectively. Hans-Georg Ehrhart of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg said:   “Regional organizations such as the African Union should play an increasing role in terms of coordinating national SSR activities and joint concept development. These organizations should provide a framework for a modularised whole of government approach.” His comments were echoed by Agata Gorecka of the University of Waterloo who made a link between the engagement of regional organizations and the promotion of local ownership, suggesting that regional bodies were “better suited to implementing more sustainable reform processes.”

Security Sector Reform & The Rule of Law

e-CONFERENCE DAY TWO SUMMARY, PART TWO

Non-State Actors

On the potential role that non-state actors can play in SSR, Marcela Donadio of RESDAL, the Latin American Network of Security and Defence, pointed to the beneficial results of engaging non-state actors, and stating that “The inclusion of non-state actors makes a linkage with a society that may fear or distrust the developments driven only by governments which rarely control or conduct the armed and security forces.” Several participants were wary of the prospect of working with non-state security and justice providers. Babacar Diouf of the Senegalese Military likened it to “a deal with the devil [that] may come back to haunt…” the recipient government and donors. Thomas Dempsey would go on to argue: “When it is necessary to partner with local non-state actors as security providers, SSR planners must take care to analyze both the advantages and disadvantages of such collaboration, and should seek measures to mitigate potential negative affects on state legitimacy and functionality.”

Developing Whole-of-Government Approaches to SSR

Mark Sedra of the Centre for International Governance Innovation reminded participants that a widely recognized key to the success of donor-supported SSR programs is the creation of a comprehensive and integrated cross-governmental approach. According to Sedra, “Few have achieved this in practice and I know of no donors that have an explicit whole-of-government strategy for SSR.” Salim Fakirani supported this point asserting that “greater emphasis is required by donor governments to develop a whole-of-government SSR strategy - such a strategy should ensure that the appropriate roles and responsibilities are clearly articulated between the various actors involved - not only defence, diplomacy and development, but also justice, border, corrections etc.”

e-CONFERENCE DAY TWO SUMMARY, PART THREE

Question to Consider:

Perhaps the major question to emerge from today’s discussion was: What would an SSR framework capable of facilitating inter-agency and inter-governmental collaboration and coordination look like, and how can international consensus around its key features be achieved ?

Looking Ahead to Day 3

Day 3 will evaluate one of the most pressing issues facing the SSR model, the ‘conceptual-contextual’ divide. Among the questions we hope to address are:

• What are the unique demands placed on the SSR model in different implementation settings?
• Have the core norms and principles of SSR been adequately reflected in SSR programming over the past decade?
• Are there clear success stories of SSR that can be emulated?
• How can you make the SSR process more adaptable to diverse environments?

Background material provided to help shape the discussion include:

VIDEO - Interview: Security Sector Reform in Indonesia , Mufti Makaarim al-Ahlaq (Institute for Defence, Security and Peace Studies) and Sri Yunanto (Western Michigan University)

VIDEO - Interview: Security Sector Reform in South Sudan , Abraham Sewonet (North-South Institute) & Simon Lubang (Centre for Peace and Development Studies - University of Juba)

VIDEO - Interview: Security Sector Reform in Hait i, Isabelle Fortin & Yves-François Pierre (Independent Consultants)

VIDEO - Interview: Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan , Mark Sedra (Centre for International Governance Innovation)

PAPER - SSR and Post-Conflict Resolution: The Armed Wing of State Building? Paul Jackson (University of Birmingham)

PAPER - Learning the Hard Way: Implementing Security Sector Reform in Post-Authoritarian States , Alice Hills (Leeds University)

PAPER - Following the Yellow Brick Road? Examining Experiences with Security Sector Reform in Africa , Lauren Hutton (Institute for Security Studies)