Posted on behalf of Professor Eboe Hutchful, Chair of the Africa Security Sector Network (ASSN)

1. What are the major demands placed on the SSR model in different implementation settings?

This is a huge question, and I am not sure (assuming that I understand the question in the first place) that it can be answered with any brevity.  However, it is an important question given that SSR is supposed to be ‘context-driven’. I am inclined to answer it by questioning whether the approach of the international community has indeed being shaped by, and necessarily responsive to, issues of context. Certainly SSR has been attempted in a wide diversity of contexts, though most of these have been post-conflict in character (recognizing that the term ‘post-conflict’ can not only be misleading, but also covers a great diversity of situations), and that these embody both exceptional opportunities for and constraints to SSR, which cannot be explored here. Post-conflict contexts require certain instruments (such as DDR, military integration, rebuilding of security institutions, etc) that have become part of the international toolkit for SSR in such circumstances, with some variation depending on whether SSR is occurring in the context of ongoing counter-insurgency (such as Iraq, Afghanistan) or some form of peace agreement (or not). However, given that  most of the demand for SSR has come precisely  from states least equipped to design and execute large scale reform of this sort, it can be expected that issues of institutional capacity, ownership, resources, etc will be common to SSR exercises regardless of context.

PART 2 - Eboe Hutchful

In my view, however, what has decisively shaped design and implementation of SSR are two principal factors, as well as the interactions between and among them:
First, the response and level of commitment of the international community to national SSR, the framework for extending external assistance (multilateral? bilateral? privatized?), the character (and motivations) of the lead external actors, and relations between donors. Variations in these factors mean that every case of SSR potentially faces a distinctive external environment and set of donor dynamics. The contrast is particularly striking in several of the ongoing cases of SSR in Africa. For instance: donors have flooded into the DRC (where almost all the major governmental actors are present, and where donor competition over police and military reform has been visible) and to a lesser extent Burundi (although the international presence here may be more notable for the number of international NGOs), but have largely stayed clear of Sierra Leone and Liberia (in the case of the former because of the strong UK bilateral lead, and in the latter, the perception perhaps that Liberia is a US ‘preserve’). The two bilateral leads, the UK and the US, have put very different stamps on ‘SSR’ in Sierra Leone and Liberia, although both countries are increasingly privatizing their SSR assistance programmes. The rush into the DRC is difficult to explain on any grounds other than the strategic and economic stakes involved (although one should also allow for some measure of humanitarian concern). Yet the DRC may be ‘levelled’ downwards in terms of the fact that relative to the stakes involved, resources remain meager (as in the other African cases);

Part 3 -   Eboe Hutchful

Second, the response of national authorities and actors: while the national authorities in Sierra Leone and Liberia have been characterized by a relatively high degree of political coherence, and have ranged from pliable or ‘compliant’ in their relations with donors, those in the DRC and Burundi (both with higher-profile internal conflicts) have been more assertive. And while both Sierra Leone and Liberia have expressed a preference for a comprehensive approach by donors, national authorities in the DRC and Burundi have preferred a piecemeal approach and bilateral (rather than multilateral) relationships, perhaps reflecting concern over undue donor influence over this important area of sovereignty, as well as a desire to maximize resources and political ‘wiggle room’.    

Significantly, owing to such dialectics -- the sometimes difficult relations between donors and national authorities, and rivalries among national stakeholders, and between external actors -- neither donors nor national authorities have succeeded in evolving comprehensive reform plans or viable coordination mechanisms in the these many-sided conflicts in the DRC and Burundi. My point here is that SSR programmes are more often than not creatures of circumstance rather than careful calibration to context.

Part 4 -   Eboe Hutchful

2. Have the core norms and principles of SSR been adequately reflected in SSR programming in the past decade?

The core principles of  SSR are comprehensiveness, transparency and inclusiveness,
respect for context, local ownership and political legitimacy of the process, and security in the context of rule of law (i.e. SSR as a governance not merely technical exercise). The need for (international) partnership has also been stressed.

However, typically with SSR, aspiration (norms and principles) and realities (actual programming and implementation) have tended to be far and wide apart, and are likely to remain so in light of the essential paradoxes and tensions embedded in the concept:

a. Given the realities of most post-conflict contexts, the concept seems wholly ambitious in scope; in practice, most SSR initiatives have been much more modest in character, focusing on what is feasible in the given context, with a tendency to sacrifice long-term vision. Most donor agencies are only now familiarizing themselves with the concept (or else have their own peculiar national or institutional slant); certainly, in the field few have demonstrated interest in an integrated, comprehensive and coordinated approach to reform;

b. While the scope of the concept has expanded over the last decade, the resources and political will to support the ambitious projects of reform envisaged in the model have always been in question, certainly on the part of the international community (given past record). It is now obvious that ‘demand’ for SSR by and large outstrips the ability of the international community to supply it;

Part 5 -   Eboe Hutchful

c. The stress on ‘local ownership’ is belied by the fact that very context and (political) dynamics of reform (not to mention the geopolitical interest of external actors) make this in most cases hard to realize. Not to mention that with the exception of South Africa (of the African countries mentioned here), the capacity of local actors to exercise ‘national ownership’ has been demonstrably low.

Programmatically, donors have chosen overall much more piecemeal approaches, with the overwhelming emphasis on police and defence reform, relatively weak attention to justice and corrections, governance mechanisms, and almost no attention whatsoever to intelligence reform. 

Part 6 -   Eboe Hutchful

3. Are there clear success stories of SSR that can be emulated?

South Africa and Sierra Leone stand out as African ‘success stories’, with high marks for comprehensiveness, participatory and inclusive processes, and fairly robust implementation. Additionally, South Africa is an example of local ownership (at the same time attracting substantial external interest and support), while Sierra Leone (starting from the opposite end of the spectrum in terms of national capacity and resources) may be seen as an example of committed and long-term bilateral partnership (with the UK).

However, both are facing mid-life challenges, in part from failure to address underlying issues of poverty and/or social justice alongside SSR, and in part from more specific social and political factors: in the case of Sierra Leone uncertainties associated with the recent regime change and imbalances in the SSR exercise (which placed a great deal of emphasis on building operational capacity in the security services and much less on robust oversight organs); and in the case of South Africa from high levels of crime (emanating from extremely skewed income distribution and mass poverty), and increasing politicization of Intelligence organs and the judicial process. Given the highly contextual nature of each of the two cases, it is far from clear that either can be ‘emulated’, other than in terms of the guiding principles of SSR programming.

Part 7 -   Eboe Hutchful

4. How can you make the SSR process more adaptable to diverse environments?

By making sure that SSR is locally owned from the ground up, rather than pre-empted by external actors. On the other hand, there is also plenty of evidence that (in the absence or pressure for inclusiveness and accountability), ‘local ownership’ can itself be captured by the state or dominant local actors, and may not necessarily be ‘progressive’, at minimum resulting in visions of ‘SSR’ substantially at variance with prevailing international ‘best practices’.

In my view and experience  ,African a well as Afghan situations though widely apart ,suggest that demands on SSR  models would invariably be determined by the enabling environment ,however ,its implementation  will require following:

a. Defining interests of principal donor in line with arbitrator's mandate ( such as United Nations or Regional organisations). Also a need to   appoint a principal donor by security council    incase  the  international institution/ world body is engaged  .

b. Formulation of a consultative committee to interactwith regional,national and extra state groups to build consensus on policy and implementation strategy.

c. programme of SSR has to be priortized in keeping with the interests of stake holders with  flexible timelines.

d. Sustainablity ,capacitybuilding and community participation are key areas only after a secure  environment is established hence security and law and order will invariably remain high on the agenda.

  The models to emulate are  unfortunately not many ,despite the fact that an enormous amount of resources are committed over a very long period of time. What ever little that we see  as success today is very fragile and vulnerable because of absence of long term partenership.Adapyability , sustainability and capacity building are perhaps the solutions to the problem.

Irfan Azam posted a correction to his spelling in the last two lines of his previous post. These should be read as "partnership" and "adaptability."

Thanks Agata. I am impressed with the promptness.regards

A common theme throughout today's multimedia and mentioned by Eboe Hutchful seems to be difficulty in coordinating donor activities. In their conversation on Haiti, Isabelle Fortin and Yves-François Pierre discuss a government body which is relatively unable to coordinate donor activities, while Mark Sedra discusses the five pillar model which was attempted in Afghanistan but was not successful overall because of uneven contributions, efforts, and capabilities.

Considering the multitude of environments in which SSR is conducted, how can donor activities be coordinated in the SSR model? Is an arbitrator-type body needed, such as mentioned by Irfan Azam? Or is a bilateral relationship best, such as the one witnessed with the UK and Sierra Leone?

I'd like to comment on Paul Jackson's excellent paper on Sierra Leone.  As someone who has been involved in designing and reviewing some aspects of the DFID programme, I very much support Paul's comments that the programme was rather ad hoc and evolutionary in nature, and only in retrospect have we imposed a coherent strategic approach on what happened. 

I believe (as I think Paul does) that this evolutionary approach was in fact a strength.  Many of the problems identified throughout this conference - in particular lack of sensitivity to local context and lack of local ownership - are the result of attempts at an overly-strategic approach by donors.  The typical linear model of design, followed by implementation, followed by review, means that projects are designed precisely when local capacity to own is weakest and when external donors lack the knowledge and the relationships to make good decisions based on understanding the local context.

A more iterative, evolutionary approach begins to deal with this. The aim is to construct local security agencies which will evolve in response to the human security needs of citizens. By definition we cannot define in advance what the resulting institutions will look like - different contexts will produce different institutional responses. The job of external actors is not to define in advance an "end state" to be worked towards, but instead to help build capacity of security agencies to sense and respond to local demands for security.  This creates true local ownership - not ownership of a reform process by an elite, but ownership by citizens of the structure, behaviour and priorities or their security agencies.

Alex Martin and I make this argument in more detail in the DCAF Yearbook 2008 in our chapter on "Security Sector Evolution". 

I am not sure if one can say that the relative success in Sierra Leone was a result of the bilateral relationship the government of Sierra Leone had with the UK instead of having an arbitrator-type body in place. As Paul Jackson illustrates in his paper, success in Sierra Leone was due to multiple factors including national ownership, engagement of civil society, individuals committed to SSR in Sierra Leone, and the atypical agreement between the governments of  the UK and Sierra Leone.

The memorandum of understanding between the Sierra Leone and UK Government was a ten-year plan, which as we discussed on Day 1, is highly uncommon in governments that typically only plan in electoral timeframes. Having an international body that can oversee the implementation of SSR and that does not espouse the same myopic strategies that donor governments tend to adopt can be much more advantageous.

Yes there were lots of reasons for success, in particular the very strong leadership provided by the Office of National Security.  I'd describe the UK Government's 10 year involvement as a commitment, not a plan. The long-term financial and political commitment was very important, but as I argue above and as Paul says, the actual implementation was not planned in detail in advance, and was all the better for it.

Posted on behalf of David Law, Senior SSR Advisor, International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) at DCAF and DCAF Senior Fellow in its Operations Department

What are the unique demands placed on SSR in different contexts?

Research on SSR in different contexts is still in its infancy. While it is far from clear how far one can go in making useful comparisons across contexts, there are clearly some issues that dominate some contexts and are weak in others.

The post-conflict context has been the focus of most attention, and there are several features that mark it:

- the need for stabilisation measures and pre-SSR programmes such as national reconciliation dialogues that can help set the stage for SSR;
- the tendency to build  the capacity of the security services and neglect governance aspects;
- the weakness of local elites, the domination of external actors and the difficulty of ensuring early local ownership;
- the multiplicity of actors involved in supporting SSR implementation; and
- the vulnerability of the SSR process to  donor election cycles, and so on.

Part 2 - David Law

It is difficult to establish such a list for other contexts but a few features stand out. In post-communist states, the transfer of the allegiance of the security actors from party to population and the development of eligibility for regional integration have been the key challenges. In post- or quasi-post authoritarian states the picture is less clear. Here, ensuring democratic control of armed forces is also an essential requirement but outside Europe, integration has not tended to play a role. In developing states in Africa – whether or not they are coming out of conflict – the overriding challenges involve the degree of stateness and the availability of local capacity. In mature democracies, there are other challenges. As in other contexts, mature democracies often suffer from dangerous deficits in security sector coordination. They also face the need to make adjustments in the institutional culture of their security sectors, for example, in operationalising the change from police force to police service.

In post #3, Professor Eboe Hutchful discusses the difficulties in coordination between donor and national authorities in SSR programmes. Challenges to SSR may occur from rivalries between national stakeholders and between external actors. The external actors in the donor community can include (but are not limited to) different states and different agencies within them, as well as between nongovernmental actors. The impetus for SSR came from the realization of the development-security nexus, the problem of coordination or harmonization is common throughout the development community. To draw upon today’s question regarding the ‘unique demands’ placed on SSR, does the practice of SSR face greater challenges of coordination than other development programmes?

Part 3 - David Law

Have the core norms and principles of SSR been adequately reflected in SSR programming over the last decade?

The situation in this regard has been steadily improving but there is still a long way to go. A difficulty in answering the question is posed by the fact that interpretations of SSR still vary considerably. Increasingly, however, we can refer to a broad consensus around three fundamental notions: first, that the provision of security needs to be efficient and effective; second, that security provision needs to be accountable and subject to democratic control; third, that SSR needs to begin with a holistic understanding of the broad and diverse range of actors and factors involved in a country’s security and their interrelationships. The notions are largely interlinked in the sense that you cannot have efficient security delivery without good governance or effective police reform without taking into account, for example, the links between the police sector, the legal system and the corrections regime. It is the need for a comprehensive, whole-to-the–part, approach that tends to be the least adequately reflected in programming.

Part 4 - David Law

Are there clear success stories of SSR that can be emulated?

China's first Premier, Zhou Enlai, famously replied to someone asking for his assessment of the French Revolution that it was “too soon to tell”. It is probably also too soon to tell for SSR. And then there is that perplexing issue of how do you rate an SSR programme a success, which remains a highly inexact science for the SSR community. That being said, it is probably more useful to refer to aspects of SSR programmes that have been successful and point the way to the future. Here are a few examples:

- the development of  national coordination structure for the SSR process in Sierra Leone;
- the integration of SSR into the PRSPs (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) of Burundi, Central African Republics and Guinea Bissau as well as into Uganda’s PEAP (their version of the PRSP);
- the role of women in programme design in Liberia, in particular as DDR is concerned;
- the organisational framework established in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a clear coordinating mandate being given to the Office of the High Representative and the Peace Implementation Committee bringing together principal donors, both bi- and multi-lateral; and
- the efforts of Canada and some of its allies to ensure an integrated civilian-military approach in Afghanistan, and so on.

Part 5 - David Law

How can you make the SSR process more adaptable to diverse environments?

There are several initiatives that can and should be undertaken. Here are three. The first one involves a challenge to the SSR research community to help practitioners better understand the nature of different contexts and the political dimension of SSR (see the first question) and the kinds of mechanisms and attitudes that are most conducive to effective change management when it comes to the security sector. My second recommendation goes to the practitioners who need to make more time and resources available for the assessment phase that should inform the programme design process. Assessment teams must be better prepared, better resourced and more representative in the sense that those actors that will be involved in the SSR process – both external and local – should have an appropriate role. A related notion is that SSR can profit from the use of pilot projects (or an inception period) that allow donors and partners to get to know one another better and to build the capacity and structures that will be needed for the more fully-fledged programmes that follow. Third, all this will necessitate great interaction between the SSR research and practitioner community, supported by SSR training programmes that prepare people both for thinking more relevantly about SSR at their desks and doing it more effectively in the field.

Paul Jackson's distinction between post-conflict SSR and normal SSR raises an important question about the structure, design and approaches of SSR. One of the main features of post conflict environments as Paul also highlights is the urgent demand for security prior to any reconstruction or stat-building process. Related to this issue, Mark Sedra, in his interview on SSR in Afgahnistan,  states that more international troops deployed to Afghanistan help provide buffers in order to help maintain the right environment for the reform process to take place or continue. This suggests that post conflict SSR differs from normal SSR in structure, resources and priorities. As such, post conflict SSR should have clear short term and long term goals aiming to achieve the optimal level of security environment in the short term and embark on a full implemention of SSR in the long term. Of course, important questions such as donor commitment, the state of local political conditions and the pace of progress, may remain.

A number of great points have been raised today, which I would like highlight and ask other participants to comment on:

1. Peter Wilson raises a fascinating point in regard to SSR strategy. SSR and development policy-makers and practitioners almost instinctively demand more and more strategy. What Peter Wilson and Paul Jackson are saying in reference to Sierra Leone is that perhaps less is more. A detailed and rigid strategy in complex and fluid environments can tie donors to arbitrary deadlines and approaches, perhaps based on faulty initial assumptions, before they actually understand the local environment. This would seem to support the establishment of a more evolutionary, iterative and somewhat ad hoc process? Is this the way to go in all SSR environments?

If I could throw in my two cents in, I would argue, as Anne-Marie Sanchez has, that the particular conditions in Sierra Leone made this approach possible and desirable. I see 2 intimately related reasons for this. First, the robust support of one dominant donor, the UK. One of the reasons detailed SSR strategies are important is to ensure in multi-lateral environments that everyone has the same goals and are not working at cross-purposes. This was obviously not necessary in Sierra Leone. In Afghanistan or Bosnia where there are a multiplicity of donors each bringing with them their own approaches, goals and interests, a strategy to keep everyone in line is more important. Second, the long-term commitment of the UK to the process, speaking in 10-year timeframes, is more the exception than the norm for SSR. Such a long-term commitment provides more time to learn on the job and utilize a trial and error approach. I am not sure if this would be possible in all contexts.

What do others think? Would an 'evolutionary' approach work in other cases?

Thanks Mark. There will always be a need to balance some level of coherence with some level of responsiveness to context - so I am certainly not arguing that evolutionary means "anything goes". In particular when many donors are involved there is a need to ensure that everyone accepts the same principles, agrees a division of labour and has a degree of consensus on the broad "ends". But the "means" have to be flexible and respond to circumstances.

The overwhelming argument for an evolutionary approach is in democratic concerns over local ownership. Too often local ownership means a small number of local elite, not necessarily representative, signing up to a plan.  A much deeper conception of local ownership is that all citizens can influence the development of their security sector through day-to-day direct interaction (the short route to accountability) not through the blunt instruments of parlimamentary and executive oversight (the long route). The ability of people to signal their needs, and the ability of agencies to adapt their plans in response, will grow over time and indeed that should be a key aim of the programme. To decide the answers in advance means that you are condemned to ignore this growing ability to influence.

We make this argument more carefully, define evolutionary change more precisely, and make links to current economic and institutional theory, in the 2008 DCAF Yearbook.

SSR Body of Knowledge

David Law's last point (post 20) is a crucial one: there must indeed be greater interaction between the research and practitioner communities that are engaged in designing and implementing Security Sector Reform mechanisms. This is especially true considering that SSR as a discipline and conceptual framework is still in its early stages of development and is thus subject to constant revision and exploration through fora such as this one. This can enable the ongoing construction of an SSR 'Body of Knowledge of Sorts' that can be periodically revised and updated with best practices from the field as well as rigourous quantitative and qualitative analyses from researchers.

It may well be too soon to perform an accurate assessment of the nuanced approaches that must inform the implementation of SSR in different environments. This said, the construction of a Body of Knowledge can be understood as a work in progress, whereby recent develpments in the field, stories of success and failure, and so on are integrated in coherent manner and are taken as a point of reference for practitioners and researchers alike.

Existing SSR Guidelines like those prepared by the OECD Dac may constitute an ideal starting point, but they are not sufficient as they stand. In fact, these must be subject to constant revision and expansion and susceptible to alterations. For instance, one could extrapolate from the practice of the armed forces of some countries of creating field manuals that address different conceivable scenarios of warfare. In an analogous manner, a thorough SSR Body of Knowledge could specifically include nuanced approaches that account for the different environments in which SSR has been implemented with some degree of sucess in the past, and these should be taken as a guide rather than a constraint by those in the SSR community.   

In response to Mark's question about the vaiability of an 'evolutionary' approach, I think that the only realistic approach is an iterative one, which implies flexibility and expectations of change as one goes along.  I think that there are enormous dangers in trying to engineer a complex, detailed strategy at the very early stages of an SSR process, particularly in conflict-affected countries.  The political environment is way too fluid to be able to develop complex strategies.  With regard to Afghanistan, even a relatively simple but transparent strategy that would evolve over time would be preferable to what one has now.

2. The other point I would like to highlight relates to David Law's comment that it "may be too soon to tell" if there are clear success stories from SSR. While I agree that it may be too soon to pronounce the overall success or failure of the SSR conceptual model in a global sense, surely we can identify cases where the model, as it stands, has been implemented effectively or poorly in the field. How else can we determine how the model should change and evolve?

This relates to a crucial point that is preoccupying many SSR stakeholders: How do you measure success? The US for instance is working now, according to my understanding, to design a set of metrics to assess the impact of their SSR programming. I don't know of any other such evaluation instruments. It seems to me that the UN or OECD DAC should be developing such tools. Are they? Obviously any metrics would have to be tailored to a local context, but a starting point or model is needed.

This leads me to a critical question. What should be the metrics of success for SSR? Merely saying an effective, democratically accountable and civilian led sector is not enough. Let's go deeper. Specifically, how should we measure success in different SSR implementation settings?

Reading through Paul's Serrie Leone success story, I would like to comment on the issue of Sustainability. Apparently, there are several factors that contribute to sustainability and ensuring continuity even after international actors leave or political leadership changes, I wonder if it will be feasible to attach conditinoality for a SSR program. Obviously, in some post conflict environments like Afghanistan, Iraq and in some African contexts, where potential sources of threat including armed militias, warlords, criminals, religious extremists, and insurgents tend to survive for years continuously undermining the state security and weakening state control; applying even modest conditionality may not prove to be a useful tool, but generally this may be considered as an impetus to maintain the momentum especially in transition societies where basic government and non-government oversight structures exist.

I think it is also important to bear in mind the issue of sustainability in the context of SSR. As Jackson points out in his paper, Sierra Leone is better now, however the “country remains at the bottom of the Human Development Index.” In fact insecurity is still felt by the majority of the population with rising crime rates, criminal gangs and a lack of access to basic services. All of these issues can re-ignite violent conflict. In order for the SSR strategy to be successful, the human security element should be taken into account. In his first post, Peter Wilson mentions an evolutionary approach for Sierra Leone. How should these issues be addressed in the current SSR strategy in Sierra Leone or elsewhere?

Nicole, I agree with you about Afghanistan. The problem there, as you know, was that no strategy was designed when the transition process began in 2002, and no strategy exists today.

Considering the immense problems with donor coordination and conflicting agendas, a coherent yet flexible strategy launched in the early to mid stages of the process would have been immensely beneficial. The key is flexibility and adaptability. The plan must be able to dynamically change over time in response to evolving conditions on the ground. That also raises the importance of effective Monitoring and Evaluation structures.

For strategies to be flexible they must have access to tools that are continuously analyzing and assessing conditions on the ground and the impact of reforms. This is about more than just numbers (numbers of troops and judges trained and buildings built etc...), which does not adequately show progress. Impacts rather than inputs must be assessed. It must involve qualitative measures such as assessments of civilian attitudes toward the security system. This is a gap in my view. I can't think of any extremely effective monitoring mechanisms. Donors seem to rely on the quick and dirty research study from outside consultants (I have been one of them), which can be beneficial in some cases, but often doesn't cut it.

  Can anyone give me an example of an effective monitoring and evaluation system for SSR? What should it look like?

The question of measuring success somehow relates to the strategy developed and/or to the goals set for a specific SSR program. In Afghanistan, for example, two factors are commonly cited as key for measuring success. quantity and quality. While this may not necessarily be relevant to all SSR components, it certainly is important for key components that are the police, the army, the justice sector. Increasing the number of army without providing necessary training and equipment, for example may seriously undermine the whole process of reform. There has, however, been a growing recognition and tendancy now among various donors to keep a balanced approach and ensure that reforms are applied simultaneously even though if the process takes longer.  

I would agree with what Nicole and Mark are saying with respect to a coherent strategy that can evolve over time and is flexible and adaptable enough to be useful in the early going. As pointed out coordination, unity of effort and not working at cross purposes plays a critical and important part of any SRR initiative. However, more importantly is having local ownership and buy in. It cannot be stressed enough - it has to be their plan. WE( the international community must be the "guide from the side" - putting forward ideas/options for consideration and discussion that will promote the political will to act.

Vic, you are absolutely right. The goal of the international community should be to assist local actors to develop a coherent and effective strategy. However, it is important to note two things here. First, local actors in some post-conflict contexts may lack the human and institutional resources to design, let alone implement an SSR strategy. Second, since most of the funds and support for that strategy will come from the donor community they need a major seat at the table for the strategy making process. After all, if the recipient/partner country could do it all themselves, there would be no need for donors. Moreover, donors aren't predisposed to writing blank cheques (nor should they be), particularly to states in the midst of complicated transitions. We can't deny donors a major seat at the table in the name of ownership. That simply isn't realistic or desirable in my opinion.

Referring to Qaseem's response on measuring success - re: quantity and quality. When one takes a closer look at Afghanistan -quantity and quality would not be an good indicatior of success  particularily for the ANS. Given the numbers, training provided, salaries paid ( better now then a year ago) one would have to say that the prositive results are not there to see. 26 police officers die for every (1) one Afghan soldier. Leads to the question " What are the police being used for - certainly not police work as defined by most. Thus increasing the numbers without adequate training( quality ??), equipment and pay  serves little useful purpose in moving forward and has little impact on changing the public perception  that police cannot be trusted and are corrupt. Further if the security situation does not allow for police to carry out "policing" duties then success has not been achieved...

Professor Eboe Hutchful raises two important issues or in fact concerns regarding SSR. First, that SSR is largely ambitious in scope, but in practice (in the fields) it has been modest for obvious reasons such as those  discussed over the last three days. Second, Professor Hutchful raises concern about the continued reluctance of donors to support comprehensive and long term projects. Given the challenges discussed in the interviews today, are these two not important issues that need urgent attention. This takes us to Mark's question on monitoring and evaluation mechanism. Perhaps, an urgent self-assessment of SSR is needed.     

The questions on M&E are notoriously difficult and apparently common-sense measures are fraught with perverse incentives. To take one simple example - does an increase in recorded crime signal an increase in insecurity (bad) or an increase in trust in the police (good)? 

In the UK, some Chief Constables have started rejecting central Government targets because they believe they don't reflect the priorities of local communities.

The search for a set of "standard" measures is mis-conceived I think.  To define the measures is, de facto, to set the strategy, and as we have been discussing to do so according to an external template is directly inimical to local ownership.  Reaching consensus on measures should be an integral part of the locally-owned process, not something imposed externally as a programme management tool. 

Marc - agreed .-No disagreement -You are spot on. What needs to be stressed is working with the local partners to ensure that what is being proposed will work for them in the medium to long term. Experience has shown that you have influence when you hold the hammer but it will not be sustainable in the long term because once things are turned over -it will be dismantled  overnight ( Haiti springs to mind as an example). Your point is well taken though that if they could do it themselves there would be no need for donors. Referring back to an earlier response reference assessments - donors need  to reach out and take the time to assess and work with the local orgs./stuctures to gain  deeper insight and understanding of the situation before planning or implemennting a course of action/ long term strategy. 

Mark, if local actors lack capacity to design and implement SSR strategies, what does that tell us?  It might be telling us that trying to develop strategies in the early 'post'-conflict period is the wrong way to go.  Perhaps what we need to think about is a process of identifying needs (of governments, of people), beginning to address some of those, and simultaneously helping to move the thought processes along, consciously helping to develop the capacity for strategic thinking.   But that of course is not what the international community seems to be interested in.  This is not a question of giving donors a seat at the table or not.  They are going to be there.  It is what they say and do when they get there.  The incentives simply are not there for a patient, incremental approach on the part of international actors.  There is a need to spend money and spend it fast, preferably on high-profile activities that ministers can have their pictures taken next to.  The challenge is to feed that beast as well as to figure out how to nuture a process that will actually allow national actors, both governmental and non-governmental, to learn to speak with each other and develop a measure of respect for each others' points of view and then figure out how to proceed.

Nicole Our paper to be published here tomorrow discusses a programme with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior which worked to develop the Ministry's own strategic planning capabilities, including identifying security needs of the population and developing systems for M&E. Perversely, the more chaotic the situation the better the programme sometimes - when the Iraq programme was designed, the situation was so fluid that donors had no choice but to accept that a long-term strategic plan was impossible, so they supported a modest, incremental programme to increase the management capability of mid-level civil servants.   Similarly in Yemen, a difficult place for reform, the DFID design team have recommended a modest, incremental approach. In more stable, accessible countries it would be all too tempting, but counter-productive, to go for the sort of grandstanding approach you identify. 

Nicole, I agree that before you even think of developing a strategy, a needs assessment has be a undertaken; a political consensus developed among local and external actors on the need for, and goals of the process nurtured; and the appropriate resources mobilized. This is, as described earlier, a time to build confidence in and support for the process. I would not suggest finalizing a strategy on day one of the transition, but I think waiting too long to chart some goals and a a flexible and incremental process to achieve them is perhaps just as dangerous as setting those goals too early. Without a strategy donors and local actors alike are more apt to fall into the trap of short-term thinking/programming that has plagued SSR processes in numerous contexts. 

Your last point is very right on. But practically speaking, how do you, from the point of view of external supporters of SSR, "nurture a process that will actually allow national actors, both governmental and non-governmental, to learn to speak with each other and develop a measure of respect for each others' points of view and then figure out how to proceed?"

Peter, Good to hear.  I'll definitely have a look at your paper.  Have you figured out how to transfer these examples of virtue by necessity to ordinary programming?  When Luc van de Goor and I were doing the GCPP review, we came across lots of discussion among UK officials in-country on how to deal with this phenomenon and part of it came down to a good communication strategy and managing upwards and part of it involved having some parts of the work produce things that are tangible and can be used for the inevitable photo ops.

Mark,  I guess we start by reading Peter's paper!  But seriously, it involves taking the time to sit down with people, develop relationships, understand the situation.  This evolves over time and of course can't be the only thing you are doing, both because your bosses won't stand for it and also because local actors want tangible things as well.  And those tangible things can be part of your entre into more intangible objectives.  And working on a concrete activity can be very helpful in bringing people together.  It is not always a matter of finding dialogue opportunities but 'simply' getting people used to working with each other.

But as you know I do agree that if one ignores even the most elemental form of strategy development, that is not good.  The point is to work toward that slowly and patiently, not ignore it and then 6 years down the road decide to develop a strategy yesterday.  But also not to try to push something down peoples' throats that they simply cannot deal with for one reason or another at a very early stage in 'post'-conflict periods.

I'd very much support Nicole's approach.  It always helps to start with some tangible activities to build trust and show relevance.  In the early days, when the donor is at their most ignorant and has the fewest trusting relationships, some of these initiatives will fail.  But the point is to use all these to diagnose how the system works and to design better initiatives in future.  To use a horrible medical analogy, to work on eg improving the accountancy function in a Ministry is like using an X-ray to track the path of a barium meal through the body - you analyse the progress of the initiative to understand how the system works.

So when we recommend an iterative approach we are not saying you have a series of unconnected, short-term, non-strategic interventions. We say that you start small, learn, build local capacity to contribute to what you do, so that over time the programme becomes more strategic.  The point is to base the strategy based on the sort of tacit knowledge that you get from doing. Not to build it on the limited analytical knowledge you get from visiting for two weeks and doing an assessment, on which 3-5 years activity is then based.

Firstly my congratulations to Paul Jackson, Lauren Hutton and Alice Hills for their excellent papers. These certainly contribute to the SSR debate.

On the issue of unique demands, I can only agree with Eboe Hutchful (Hi Eboe) that all SSR processes must be context driven. This is true for most things in life. However to try to define all the variables in the many realities is quite impossible. As a parallel the same is true for military operations. Whilst lessons can be learned from each, they can not summarily be applied to different realities. If this were so, most of us whould be out of work.

What is however enduring is the issue of principles. Principles are basic truths that have been learned from the study of many, many historic examples. On the study of the principles of war one goes back to Sun Tsu dating more than 2000 years ago and as has been built on by many scholars of the military profession since then. And in knowing the principles one learns that applying them all will not guarentee success but ignoring them will ensure failure.

So back to SSR. Each situation will bring about unique demands and must be managed within its particular context but the fundamental principles of SSR will remain. Basic truths can not be altered regardless of the context. Eboe has correctly stated some of these basic principles (truths) in his comment. Let me quote, "The core principles of  SSR are comprehensiveness, transparency and inclusiveness, respect for context, local ownership and political legitimacy of the  process, and security in the context of rule of law (i.e. SSR as a governance not merely technical exercise). The need for (international) partnership has also been stressed". Allow me to add to this.

I agree with Nicole Bali's comment. Working for peace in post-conflict settings and even during conflict requieres "to sit down with people" and build relationships. Of course this is not going to be easy. However, perfect reforms on paper can be translated in a waste financial and human resources... and worse, in the escalation of the conflict. How to measure strong relationships? what type of indicators should we develop? what type of strategy do we design: long-term or short term? This discussion also takes us to the debate two days ago regarding the role of the non-state actors: when and how to reach them, etc.

Many participants have brought forth the issue of SSR as a context-driven process.  Alice Hills’ paper discusses SSR in Africa in terms of police reform and Lauren Hutton illustrates the complexity of SSR in Africa by analyzing Guinea Bissau and Central African Republic. Both of these papers present serious challenges to SSR implementation.  Most evident in both papers was the challenge of corruption in all levels of government as well as the security forces. Training and codes of conduct are provided as examples to overcome this endemic corruption. However, as both authors point out, the cause of corruption is usually connected with the low wages received by the security forces.

So the question to the group of participants is how can the problem of corruption be alleviated in post-conflict environments? Is this possible?

On metrics, I think Peter's earlier point that "The search for a set of ‘standard’ measures is mis-conceived", is a good one. Just like the wider SSR model, you can't blindly and dogmatically implement its principles without consideration of context. However, that doesn't mean that the basic principles are not useful. They provide a starting point or guide, as Eboe and Len have mentioned.

I think it is useful to start thinking about what would be some model measures of effectiveness for SSR programs in different contexts. We don't need to use all the tools we identify in every context. Some simply won't be appropriate in certain cases. However, it is good to have a full toolbox to consider and adapt to local circumstances when designing or evaluating an SSR program.

I would be curious to hear what other participants think are good measures of effectiveness. Peter mentioned how crime rates can be misleading. I agree. Are there other measures that can be used? For instance, what about public polling/surveys?

More from Len

The most important issue on the table in the SSR debate, as in the issue of war, strategy and most others in life is the issue of Object/Goal/Aim. If we can not define this clearly the rest of our strategies are mere fantasies. Let me offer a (hopefully principled) approach to this. I postulate that the object of SSR is the establishment of Secutiry Services that are: Appropriate to the real needs of the the people that they serve and that pay for this service; Adequate to provide this service professionally and effectively; Affordable to the people that carry the burden and; Accountable to the person in the street that should be the object of all we do - afterall, what is the object of security if it does not serve the most deprived in our respective societies.

For the rest, I support the focus that Eboe  and others placed on local ownership, political will and the rest.  But let me add a last thought for now. The sooner we break away from the premise that SSR is a Northern invention the better. The general contribution to SSR from the North is very technical and pretty negative  (2% stuff) and driven only by their national interests. Given the fact that the leader of the North accounts for nearly 50% of the worlds military expenditure and delivers so little, argues for a broadening of the SSR debate.

Carla raises a very important question - I think it's critical to look at the softer dimensions of SSR and assess the relationship and dynamics between the citizens and the security sector within the post-conflict context.

I recently had the opportunity to interview David Beer, Director of Africa Programs at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, who also served with the RCMP and helped implement SSR programs in countries such as Haiti, Liberia, and Central African Republic. Mr. Beer suggested that in order to change the often corrupt image of police officers within fragile states, the job must become admirable and sought after by the local population. He also notes that higher salaries are not the only solution. Similar to military camps around the world, the government could provide the families of police officers with tangible benefits such as education for their children, in lieu of higher salaries. Police officers would then reconsider corrupt behaviour since the risk of losing their job would not only mean a loss of wages but it would also translate to less opportunities for their children.  While this may not solve all levels of corruption, the police forces are often considered most corrupt and most visible to the local population. Therefore, alleviating corruption at this level of the security sector is imperative.

Corruption is a very important element to consider because it is this negative perception that causes mistrust among the local population. The local population too often sees the security state apparatus as abusive and an arm of the political elite. Therefore, there needs to be a cultural change in attitudes and perceptions. Similarly, this point can be raised in connection to non-state actors. Maria-Lucia asks what their role should be and when and how to reach them. One follow-up question is who do we mean by non-state actors? Paramilitaries in the Colombian context, for example, were perpetrators of grave human rights abuses. The AUC has been "demobilized", however, they have been replaced by new groups of paramilitaries. Would the process lose legitimacy and credibility among the local population if we include these parties?

Mark, thank you for stressing the need to 'go deeper...' in the measurement of SSR success in specific contexts. One key way, in my view, to go about this would be to talk to and involve ordinary citizens (the supposed beneficiaries of reforms) in establishing what is a success or lack of it. No doubt, SSR in Sierra Leone, for instance, has been a relative success (at least in many of its aspects as has been underlined in the foregoing discussion), the perspectives of 'street people' may throw up deficits that could qualitatively undermine the gains made in local ownership, coordination structures, oversight, etc. At the end of the day, people would want to ask: 'what has changed for us?', and 'are there other real and immediate threats or insecurities that the ongoing reforms are not responding to?' Measuring SSR through the lenses and from the view point of the people does not only ensure a participatory (or inclusive) approach, but helps to resolve some of the paradoxes of the concept, not least the stress on international normative standards and the hushed reference (if any) to day-to-day security dilemmas of the common as opposed to that of the state.

POST on behalf of Babacar DIOUF :

I concur with Len on the objective, keeping in mind that:

- Strategy is the management of objective, ways and means, and any unbalance between the three calls for readjustments or failure;

- One’s strategy is the best only after victory;

- It’s highly dependant on the adversary (here all structural and human obstacles one can meet ; each case presenting differences that can turn a once victorious strategy into a failure);

- Small numbers make generalizations tricky

Consequently, for the time being, I’m tempted to suggest that in this area we are back to the practice of an Art (not a science): only broad guidelines and principles can be made available to the SSR people; for the rest they need to be modest, reactive, bold and creative, like in a battlefield. They also need a strong support (human and material resources)from the people or institutions they represent. Finally, like in the Art of war, this whole debate highlights the importance of the evaluation phase where reality is appreciated, obstacles and support evaluated, objectives refined, ways set, and means requested. Anne-Marie remarks finds its way in the application of the OODA loop : observe the scene, study the people you deal with, and act when necessary on centers of gravity you just found.

I agree with Dr. Mark Sedra on the high importance of Monitoring and Evaluation for researchers, policy makers, and practitioners. Clearly, there are many ways to measure success and these vary with the actor, or group of actors making judgement.

A recognition of the need for coordination and coherence has led to an increased use of pillar strategies among the international community. This allows the policy community to recognize dominant thematic focuses, while recognizing the interdependent nature of each pillar. I would argue that all actors would benefit from a like approach in the area of Monitoring and Evaluation. The dominant pillars might represent measurements related to input, process (see the principles outlined by Eboe as examples), output (services and achievement of goals such as those put forth by Len le Roux #47), and perception/reflection (see Mark Sedras suggestion for public polls #46). Such an approach would perhaps prevent a generalized claim for success or failure, and also help identify or flag weak points which may undermine the sustainability of SSR in the long term (within a particular area).

Measuring Progress

There are definitely certain objective criteria that can serve to measure the overall progress of SSR programs and determine whether the strategies employed need to be revised and corrective action taken. Moreover, it's only natural that the measures utilized for this purpose should be along the lines of those that were considered in the initial assessment to determine that a reform of the Security Sector was needed in the first place. At a given point in time during the implementation of SSR, these points of reference can be compared to how they measured before SSR started to be carried out.

To name a few, all of which can be measured with a certain degree of objectivity and compared to their status before SSR commenced:

1. Overcrowding and sanitary conditions in correctional facilities.

2. Number of trained police per 1000 inhabitants.

3. Proportion of civilians to military personnel in the state's security agencies. Also, relationship of command and subordination (between civilians and military)at the decision-making level of these institutions

4. Proportion of males to females in the agencies related to the Security Sector to determine progress in terms of gender equality

5. Number of courts, tribunals and other bodies (like Human Rights Tribunals or Ombudsmen) that address issues of Human Rights violation that have been created

6. Length of time between detention and trial of offenders, access to legal recourse and respect for legal actions like Habeas Corpus

7. Proportion of members of the state's Security Sector who have received Human Rights training

Like Mark Sedra aptly pointed out earlier, not all measures are applicable in all contexts. Nonetheless, some of the aforementioned criteria can certainly be used as a measure of SSR progress. Admittedly, not every criterion is to be quantifiable, but there are certainly ways to gauge progress on areas related to trust in the security agencies, perception of corruption, etc. through polls and the like.

Measuring Progress - cont'd

To build on the earlier point, I believe that having clear, identifiable measures of progress is not only desirable but, from my perspective, indispensable, as a fundamental element of SSR implementation. This said, there is a very important difference between, on the one hand having a clear criteria of what progress entails and, on the other, disproportionately allocating resources (human, financial and otherwise) only to activities that will yield quick, quantifiable results in order to 'have something to show' for the effort and investment in the SSR programs. Ideally, practitioners and researchers should embrace the former and take caution in the latter.

The potential problem of over relying on quantifiable metrics notwithstanding, the fact remains that success can be measured and, in fact, has been. This is why we can make certain educated judgments about contexts as dissimilar as, say, South Africa and Haiti ; because we look at the specific shortcomings that prompted the Security Sector to be reformed in the first place and judiciously track their development. To suggest otherwise (that SSR progress and success cannot be effectively measured) reduces SSR to a random set of activities with no clear direction that will make it hard, if not impossible to ever say ‘mission accomplished’.

Cesar Jaramillo's indicators are a good start for measuring SSR success.

In addition I would advocate for qualitative approaches for measuring sucess:

- Perception of safety

- Peoples's understanding of participation

- Effective youth participation

- Motivations behind vote preferences

- Perception of trust to institutions (judiciary, military, etc)

Of course this would require different indicators, methodologies and approaches, but it would complement quantitative indicators and would provide a more accurate picture.

e-CONFERENCE DAY 3 SUMMARY, PART 1

Today’s session on the contextual-conceptual, or policy-practice divide in SSR featured our most dynamic discussion to date. Below is a summary of the major themes discussed:

Monitoring and Evaluation & Metrics of Success

  An emerging theme was the challenge of assessing the impact of SSR and establishing effective monitoring and evaluation (M&E) structures. What are the metrics of success for SSR in different implementation settings? Jeffrey Isima, the Coordinator of the African Security Sector Network (ASSN), emphasized that “ measuring SSR through the lenses and from the viewpoint of the people does not only ensure a participatory (or inclusive) approach, but helps to resolve some of the paradoxes of the concept, not least the stress on international normative standards and the hushed reference (if any) to day-to-day security dilemmas of the common as opposed to that of the state .” Peter Wilson of the Libra Group outlined the dangers of applying universal, off-the-shelf standards and metrics transposed from one context to the next. While other participants supported his call for contextualization – a common theme of the conference – there was broad recognition of the need to think more deeply about how to measure success in SSR contexts in a more nuanced and innovative manner.

e-CONFERENCE DAY 3 SUMMARY, PART 2

Donor Coordination and Strategy

The related challenges of developing an SSR strategy and coordinating donor activities in particular implementation contexts was a subject that aroused considerable interest and debate. Peter Wilson’s suggestion near the outset of the day, that the design of a comprehensive donor strategy at the beginning of a reform process can do more harm than good, resonated with many participants. Based on the Sierra Leonean experience, Wilson recommended an “evolutionary approach” to reform that was both iterative and flexible rather than prescriptive and rigid. Nicole Ball of the Centre for International Policy concurred, noting that if donors are to get SSR right they must take “the time to sit down with people, develop relationships, understand the situation” things that take time. However, Ball also noted that in the world of SSR policy and practice there are few incentives to take such a long-term approach. It appears that donor success in SSR may require a change in their modus operandi and a transformation of their internal incentive systems.

e-CONFERENCE DAY 3 SUMMARY, PART 3

Other participants agreed that in complex, multi-dimensional and multilateral SSR cases, there is a need to establish a strategy – negotiated with local actors – that lays out coherent objectives and establishes the roles and responsibilities of local and external stakeholders. It is critical that this strategic framework is linked to   peace-building and development processes and is flexible and adaptable, allowing it to change in line with broader political and security conditions.

LOOKING AHEAD TO DAY 4

Tomorrow’s topic for discussion is security sector reform and peace-building . Among the questions we hope to address are:

    *  Why is SSR important for peace-building and vice versa?
    * What are the specific challenges that SSR programs have faced in post-conflict environments?
    * Can SSR be successfully implemented in areas facing high levels of insecurity?
    * What actors and processes should the SSR agenda engage with more effectively in post-conflict environments?