Posted on behalf of Edward Rees, Peace Dividend Trust, East Timor

“What are the specific challenges that SSR programs have faced in post-conflict environments?”

SSR initiatives are plagued with a history of average to very poor results.  There are a plethora of reasons for this.  Ultimately, SSR is a highly political, as opposed to technical process, which takes decades or generations to achieve even moderate results.

Set against this we send well meaning “consultants/contractors” to provide “technical assistance” in country for ranging from a week to 2 years.  Bereft of language skills, political nouse, and the requisite money to get things done they often act as SSR “sea anchors”.

Bi-lateral actors have the money, political weight, and long-term view necessary to be serious actors, but they also have real and perceived national interests, which negate their potentially constructive role.

 While multilateral organizations are very good at being politically neutral, they lack money, political clout, and are heavily laden with mission mercenaries who spend more time studying their benefits package than the country they are in…..how to fix this?

This posting comes from Timor-Leste where the author has watched SSR initiatives on the ground and from a distance for a decade.  Frankly, as of May 2009, there is a lot more attention and money being directed at the SSR issue here, but the results are still exceedingly shoddy. Why is this?

Edward Rees identifies one of the largest challenges in SSR programs - finding the balance between the ‘technical assistance’ and the political process of SSR. Both are important to successful SSR programs, but currently SSR programs seem to focus on the political aspects more than the technical assistance parts. Alex Martin and Peter Wilson in their paper “The Role of the Private Sector in Security Sector Reform” work at addressing these challenges.

While Rees comments that “bi-lateral actors have the money, political weight, and long-term view necessary to be serious actors,” he also notes that they often have other ambitions which negate some of their legitimacy. Martin and Wilson add that “governmental and multinational donors do not have a ‘standing army’ of serving civil servants and military and security officers who are equipped with both technical and consulting skills and are willing to deploy (often at short notice) to support capacity building in host countries. It is precisely this gap that the private sector can fill” (1). The private sector, Martin and Wilson go on to write, “ can provide a mix of individuals with front-line experience in the delivery of security, individuals who understand change management, and individuals with the sort of ‘soft’ consulting skills that focus on ‘mentoring not doing’ who are able to support local owners to make their own decisions” (6). 

While the public sector is still very important in SSR programs, there is a role for the private sector as well. Should the role of the private sector be more focused on providing technical assistance while the public sector focus more on political processes? As one of today’s questions asks: What actors and processes should the SSR agenda engage with more effectively in post-conflict environments?

Regarding the issue of the private sector in SSR, I would like to add a few thoughts. Whilst it is true that the private sector can contribute to capacity building in the security sector, it is also true that this private sector capacity is mostly located in the North. With few exceptions, little of such capacity lies in the South and in Africa in particular. This brings the dilemma of lack of local ownership and local solutions to local problems. In the South African case, there was a lot of private sector involvement in reform processes, most notably the defence transformation process, but this was largely local with some support from the international community. This local nature of the private sector involvement, greatly contributed to local solutions and a general national consensus on the results of the reform processes.

The concern is that, if by private sector involvement we mean 'the private sector of the North', we will find it difficult to reach any form of solution based on local needs, capacities and culture and therfor struggle to get any form of national consensus. I would therefor add that private sector involvement should as far as possible involve local capacity and where that is small and restricted, the process should support the building of capacity of the local private sector to become engaged in the SSR debate.

Lastly, we also need to define some parameters for private sector engagement. All of the private sector are not saints and come with their own interests and agendas. Whilst I support the involvement of think tanks, academics and scholars, professional management consultants, NGOs and others, I would have serious reservations about the involvement of private military comapanies or the private security industry in SSR processes as their self-interest may override the interests of the people.

Len le Roux correctly states that it seems most private sector actors are based in the global North. As well, for SSR to be successfully implemented, local ownership of the process is very important, as is seen in such cases as the process in South Africa. How are these two concepts reconciled? Although local ownership is important in post-conflict SSR programs for eventual success, the state and other organizations within the state (private or public) are often devastated and unable to work properly following a conflict. 

Len le Roux identifies that the private sector is not wholly 'good'. Len mentions that "the involvement of think tanks, academics and scholars, professional management consultants," among others are desirable private sector actors while private military companies are not.  What type of private sector engagement should occur? Which actors in the private sector should be involved? Are there any that should not be included in SSR programs?

In what ways can the private sector (perhaps coming from the North) engage local actors and empower them to continue after donors have left the post-conflict area?

Posted on behalf of Mark Knight, Consultant

SSR is increasingly viewed by international actors as a vital component of any post-conflict/peace-building intervention. Post-conflict environments are often characterized by weak state institutions, fractured political situations, tension and mistrust between the state’s security institutions and large portions of the population, as well as a proliferation of armed actors; many of which combine security, political and economic functions and objectives. The key factors to be addressed by SSR processes in post-conflict environments concern the state’s loss of the monopoly of legitimate force. 

The two areas of focus for SSR initiatives in post conflict environments can be seen therefore as: monopoly of force and legitimacy of force.

Restoring or establishing the state’s monopoly of force requires the planning and implementation of a number of programmatic initiatives, including DDR, small arms and light weapons and capacity-building of police and border forces. The restoration, establishment or enhancement of the state’s legitimacy when employing force requires more process-focused interventions. A state’s claim to legitimacy will often be based upon its claim to represent the wishes, and meet the needs of, the people. Moreover, force within this context includes not only the ability to compel citizens, but also the reciprocal requirement to ensure ‘due-process’, justice and the rule of law. 

The requirement of SSR initiatives to simultaneously engage in immediate programmatic interventions such as DDR, whilst also supporting longer-term process-driven interventions, aimed at enhancing the state’s legitimacy in the security arena, represents the most challenging aspects of SSR within post-conflict environments. The duality of roles and approaches is often beyond the present concepts of SSR, and the organisations called upon to engage-in, support or lead SSR in post-conflict environments.

Mark Knight states that “the key factors to be addressed by SSR processes in post-conflict environments concern the state’s loss of the monopoly of legitimate force . The two areas of focus for SSR initiatives in post conflict environments can be seen therefore as: monopoly of force and legitimacy of force.”

When considering how a state can regain a legitimate monopoly of the use of force one must also consider how the state will gain the trust of its citizens back following a conflict (especially if the state was one of the perpetrators of violence). Nicholas Galletti and Michael Wodzicki in their paper “Security Human Rights: Shifting the Security Sector Reform Paradigm” address the role human rights must have in SSR. Galletti and Wodzicki write that “a human rights approach puts the focus on the relationship between the rights holders and the duty-bearer, and seeks to adjust the institutions, laws and processes to ensure the duty-bearer fulfills its obligations, and the rights holder enjoys his or her rights. The security sector reform shift that is needed is from state-capacity paradigm, to a state-obligation paradigm” (5). They then outline four different principles that allow a state to fulfill the obligations it has to its citizens regarding their human rights. Implementing these key four principles as a minimum of state obligation to its people will result in “a security sector that contributes to fulfilling state obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights, rather than undermine them” (7). 

Challenges exist to implementing the rights-based approach to SSR, but that should not hinder attempts to make this shift. Is a human rights-based approach to SSR better than current SSR models? Or, is this a prescription for securitizing human rights? 

I absolutely agree with Len's comments. The first thing we have to do is break down the term 'Private Sector'. I believe that there is a tremendous un-served demand in technical and country/context-specific assistance for SSR that could and should be provided by private sector actors. Outside the private sector, organizations such as ISSAT/DCAF have emerged with the very purpose of providing rapidly deployable specialists on demand. This is an immensely positive sign. However, such organizations cannot alone satisfy the massive demand. Moreover, several governments are in the process of establishing civilian expert pools to meet their own capacity needs, but they face a host of problems, not to mention security clearance, contracting issues etc... The private sector could overcome many of the hurdles and quickly.

However, when it comes to private security and military companies, who are working to engage more and more in SSR and even development programming, I have reservations. Most of my concerns are based upon my experience in Afghanistan. For instance, the quality of assistance provided by DynCorp to train the Afghan police under a large US contract was mixed to say the least. According to former Afghan Interior Minister Ali Jalali, more than a quarter of the first batch of trainers deployed by DynCorp lacked adequate qualifications. According to some reports, the 'trainers' deployed by DynCorps included private security guards and former prison guards from the U.S. with no policing experience. Clearly, quality control was lacking.

I would also agree with Len that donors should be focusing resources on developing Southern capacity to provide this assistance. Some of that capacity exists already, but it is insufficient to meet the demand.  Turning to the  Northern private sector to meet gaps in demand is a good thing, as long as there is appropriate quality control and monitoring and evaluation of their work.

The usual North-based suspects

Regarding the involvement of North-based private sector in SSR programs:

While a seductive argument, I do not find it entirely convincing, as Len le Roux has suggested, that there is a clear-cut distinction between the involvement of private military consultants on the one hand, and NGO's, academics and management consultants, on the other, with the former being less desrirable than the latter. Indeed, it is easy to demonize private companies operating in the security sector, and often rightly so (think Blackwater, et al). However there is a difference between military contractors actively engaged in combat operations and stabilization missions with no clear oversight mechanisms and those involved in training local security forces. It is the latter that more directly falls under the scope of SSR implementation. As such, I do not find it self-evident that their mere presence would necessarily be more pernicious to SSR sustainability than the presence of government military personnel, just by virtue of their private nature.

As far as self-interest is concerned, specifically the possibility of it prevailing over the interests of the people, I would ask: what exactly constitutes self-interest? Because if it is understood as competition for grants, resources, contracts, the possibility to have a window of operation and potentially perpetuate their involvement in the country undergoing SSR, I would think NGO's, management consultants, even academics, compete as well, perhaps as fiercely, for a 'piece of the pie' and donor resources.

Finally, the fact that these private actors are North-based should not be inherently problematic. It seems to me that a corollary to this is that if they were South-based, say from a neighboring country, the problems associated with creating local ownership would be mitigated, which I do not think is the case. External capacity is often required precisely because local capacity is limited or non-existent.

The topic of private sector actors is a very interesting one which has not yet been discussed in depth in this forum. I think it would be good to explore this a little further. The paper by Alex Martin and Peter Wilson directly discusses the role of private sector actors. As often happens, there appears to be both positives and negatives to including private sector actors in the SSR process. As mentioned in their paper, there is often a need for expertise in post-conflict situation with regards to “planning, budgeting, HR management, procurement, training development”. Most states coming out of violent conflict often times do not have the capacity to implement these structures. Len, however, raises an excellent point – all experts are primarily from the North and may have their own self-interests and agendas. Another challenge is financing these teams of experts. Is it an expensive endeavour to contract these private sector actors? Is it worth the investment? What do other participants think?

Mark Sedra asks whether SSR is important for peacebulding and viceversa. My question would be, what are the main differences between both concepts and practices in the field. Considering that everyday  there are new developments in conflict transformation and in what is now called strategic peacebuilding, it seems that there are many areas in which both disciplines overlap. Are we doing the same thing twice? Is there any collaboration between disciplines? Are we refering to the same phenomena with different words but in practie we are doing the same?

Following Len and Jessica’s exchanges and to echo Carla's comments, I would like to say few words on the issue of private contractors and SSR. Given that Saferworld (sorry for the self promotion but after all I am writing from the office…!) has been recently working on the subject in the UK context.  

Why is it important?

Regardless of the sector, donor agencies have traditionally outsourced implementation but the use of external contractor in SSR is likely to deepen given the general tendency for less administrative cost and resources and more aid expenditure. Against this backdrop, donors tend to favour increasingly large multi millions projects because it is easier to manage and, as Nicole stressed yesterday, it is project money quickly spent. Because of financial motivation but also due to lack of management capacity within other traditional actors (NGOs, Think Tanks, University departments, etc.), the private sector is most likely to bid for such contracts and thus have an increasingly important role in the SSR implementation picture.

Who are they?

Well, at the moment I can see 3 main categories (again in the context of UK-funded SSR projects):

Small to medium scale consultancies which are built around SSR expertise and requirements (Peter Wilson and Alex Martin can arguably be said to belong to such type of consultancy, no?)

Large management firms who enjoy capacity to manage both a large amount of money and a large pool of individual consultants. Also, these firms have traditionally been involved in public sector reform (either for Northern or Southern countries as clients).

PSCs. They are still quite far from winning an SSR project bid through development spend (Liberia may show the contrary actually so apologies for my wishful thinking) but drawing on their expertise on military and security training, they increasingly seem to consider SSR on their radars.

Mark Sedra is right to suggest that adequate quality control is a necessary element to consider when engaging private military companies. Still, it seems to me that the deficiencies that he points at based on his Afghan observations can be better understood as a matter of the military contractors being poorly trained, rather than because of their being private. In fact, a similar argument could be made when it comes to the involvement of non-private military personnel, in circumstances where the training is provided by troops of contributing countries whose military strength and efficiency is not as developed as that of, say, the US or Britain. Understandably if the training is provided by under-trained, poorly equipped troops it will leave a lot to be desired. The key, in my view, is having thorough quality control and oversight mechanisms in place when allocating such contracts, regardless of the private nature of those providing the service.

Edouard - I was avoiding joining in so as not to turn this into an advertisement, but as you've mentioned us I can't resist contributing.  Yes my company Libra are absolutely a specialised SSR consultancy, drawing on both security and management/development expertise, and emphatically not a PMC! 

Len's point on North/South expertise is important - we very often involve local individuals, NGOs and companies in our projects, precisely because we believe local context is so important.  Our job is to orchestrate things and bring specific skills, not to provide political direction - and whilst we try to be as politically sophisticated as possible (see eg my co-director Dr Andrew Rathmell's paper referred to in our paper) we rely on local owners, local advisers and the close direction of donors to help us navigate the political complexities.  In the Iraqi Ministry of Interior programme mentioned in our paper, the project was directed by Iraqi officials, advised by two Palestinian management experts and included discussions with academic institutions in Jordan and Egypt, to ensure our clients had exposure to the full range of regional experience in security reform. 

Also, I would like to comment on 2 points raised by Jessica and Len in their exchange.

Yes, private contractors can provide a wide pool of expertise easily deployable but this relates to the quality of individual consultants and here the question may well be “can we find, beyond the well sophisticated ‘word of mouth system’, a sound knowledge management mechanism which would ease donors’ selection of best individuals (mentor not doer)?” Today, the lack of intra/inter agencies communications in any country seems to result in the perpetual rotation of the same consultants names.     

Also, it is hard to separate the technical assistance from the political dimension (as yesterday exchange between Nicole, Peter and Mark regarding an evolutionary approach showed). The key seems to be to have in country donor staff keeping in mind that outsourcing does not relieve them from strategically overseeing and managing the contractor (private or not), the partner country and the project direction (for example when there is a lack of capacity or political will from the partner country or when there are risks of overlaps with another donor’s project activities, etc.).

Moreover, regarding Cesar’s comment, I agree that PMSCs are very different than companies which have been working on development and public sector governance for a while. The later, I believe, can play a positive role provided that there are sound policies in place to frame what are today haphazard practices on the ground. For example, it is important for the donor to better understand who are those companies and how do they work, improve flexibility (by focusing on result rather than output) into contracts and the biding process, engage in consortia governance (which can involve firms, NGOs, think tanks who work very differently and for different agenda).

I realise that this is all very micro level analysis and suggestions but we have been working on this for a while now and this appear to be the right level for improving the contractor-donor-counterpart triptych. Thanks.

I have a follow-up question for Peter. I know you mention your company does make an attempt to include a Southern voice in your projects. Can you name any others that do the same thing?

And for the rest of the group, we've been discussing PMCs and the general consensus appears to negative. Is it perhaps the lack of regulation that exists with these types of actors? If there was more regulation from either goverments or self-regulation to adhere to international humanitarian law, for instance, would they make a more positive contribution to SSR implementation?

Across-the-board oversight

Carla, I believe that, as I mentioned earlier, PMCs require a more nuanced assessment than simply placing them in the 'positive' or 'negative' camps. If there is indeed consensus that they are inherently negative, I would disassociate myself from it. In other words, they can play a positive role, even if they have not always done so. You are right to suggest that regulation is a key principle that should inform their operation, as is transparency. But the same principle should also guide the involvement of other external actors that are engaged in development and governance activities not directly related to the state’s security architecture. In fact, it is not gratuitous that an oft-heard criticism of NGOs is that they claim legitimacy while in reality there is little oversight and public accountability of their operations. I am certainly not unconditionally defending the actions of PMCs, and some of their excesses in the past have been well documented. Still, I would suggest that similar regulatory standars should exist for all those involved in SSR, be their operations security-related or governance-related, public or private.   

Are we taking for granted the suitability of every NGO and technical consulting personnel with no hesitation, while having doubts about the efficacy of PMCs?   

Beyond the nature of their operations, is there not a certain degree to which they are all driven by the self-interest considerations that I pointed at earlier?

Posted on behalf of David Law of ISSAT/DCAF

SSR has taken great strides in recent years:  the governance dimension is increasingly being seen to be of cardinal importance to SSR; greater attention is being paid to the non-statutory elements of the security sector; efforts are underway to forge better links between the SSR and Rule of Law policy communities. The missing link in all this is the economy and the role of the business community in establishing an environment in which the performance of a country’s security sector, governance regime and judicial institutions can be optimalised. Will this be the next major step for SSR?

Reading through Mark, Len and Cesar's points on private sector engagement in SSR, I would like to support what Cesar says, simply because one can not block a particular actor from entering a service just because it's from the north or it has its self-interests. Perhaps, the reason they do not perform well as Mark has seen in Afghanistan, is because of the weak oversight structures and lack of or inadequate accountability mechanisms (public and international) based on clearly defined expected results. In such circumstances, any actor can fail as we have seen in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Thus, while it may not be possible to completely ignore their role, what, perhaps, could be done is to ensure that they have specific objectives to achieve within strict and defined timelines. On the North-south debate, as Cesar says, if private companies are available and effective locally, there wouldn't be a need to search for "strangers"  thousands of miles away in the north, in the first place. What might be useful for the recipient country, is to ensure "knowledge transfer" is the top most results expected of a particular contractor. This can be done through training local actors and further strengthening their integration.   

It seems that my remarks about the private sector involvement in SSR have opened up quite some debate. I am totally supportive of this involvement as afterall, SSR is about establishing security services that serve the people and this can not be done without the broadest participation. I do however believe that this should include local civil society as far as possible. I did previously mention think tanks, academics, management consultancy firms, NGOs etc but neglected to say that grass roots organisations are equally important. Whilst the South may lack the first, the second is however largely in place. I support the involvement of the private sector and specifically SSR NGOs from the North, such as ISSAT/DCAF (mentioned by Mark) and  GFN-SSR, but would encourage them to always work with local civil society when engaging in Africa.  And obviously they should take note of our own African civil society capacities as reflected in the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) and the organisation that I recently left, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), amongst others. My bottom line thought on this issue is that when Northern civil society gets involved in SSR in the South, they should involve the Southern private sector as much as possible and help them build the capacity to sustain such engagements.

Then to the issue of the private military companies, private security companies and the broader private defence and security industry. They have their roles and could assist in SSR. It is however imperative to define this role clearly. I would be very cautious of allowing them to influence policy development and issues such as military postures and force design for pretty obvious reasons. On the other hand, once policy decisions have been made, these parties can be of value in providing training and capacity building to restructuring security services. It is a matter of 'the right person for the right job' and this needs to be deeply interrogated for every situation

Carla, in terms of other companies using local actors, yes many of the companies that started as conventional development consultancies and have branched into SSR will try to do that.  Donors often also suggest that local NGOs should be involved in a consortium and often have a specific organisation in mind that they wish to be involved in a bid.  Of course I'd claim that Libra do all this best!

On PMCs (or to use their preferred term PSCs), as Cesar says they vary hugely, from some wholly legitimate ones to some obviously difficult ones.  Many of them include SSR in their list of capabilities. I think the concern is however that many don't really have deep expertise in this area and in particular that they don't focus adequately on local ownership (it often seems quicker and more profitable to do something oneself than to help someone else to do it).  They draw on a wide range of military expertise but less often back this up with development or change management expertise.  Working for development donors can also be harder, and less profitable, than working for rich Governments or coporations, so often the SSR activities in a PSC are something of a poor relation to their other activities.

But I think the question of PSC's involvement in SSR is over-stated. As Edouard said, when we think of non-US initiatives I can  think of no major reform projects which have been won by a PSC, as opposed to an SSR, development or management consultancy. The more pertinent question might be: how do we ensure that pure security cooperation projects, funded by security agencies and focussed solely on force generation (ie not claiming to be SSR), adhere to some SSR principles?    There is more potential for middle ground on this than some might imagine. For example, RAND, writing from a national security point of view for the US DOD, have published papers like "Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform" and "Building Balanced Counter-Insurgency Capabilities" which make SSR-type points.

I was not trying to imply in my earlier comments that PSCs/PMCs are now heavily involved in SSR, but I think this is an emerging trend. Speaking to my PSC contatcs, many of these organizations are working to establsh SSR capcity. This is not necessarily a bad thing, as long as they engage local actors and are subjected to approriate donor oversight. 

The worrying thing about PSC/PMC involement is not the fact that they emanate from the private sector, but that they often bring a military mentality to the process which is not always conducive for SSR implementation.

What actors and processes should the SSR agenda engage with more effectively in post-conflict environments?

On the issues of actors much has been said and I have little to add. The two groups of actors that probably are most neglected are the regional and sub-regional organisations [AU and the various Regional Economic Communities (RECs)] in the African case and the emerging inter-parliamentary forums such as the SADC Parliamentary Forum in the South and the AMANI Forum in East Africa. While SSR is restricted to the national environment, the importance of developing towards a collaborative security paradigm will remain on the back burner.

On process, I believe that SSR should be led by Security Thinking Reform. In line with the issue of collaborative security, we should be rethinking the age old question, "what are security services for?" I believe that too many SSR processes are started and conducted under outdated paradigms. If we truely believe in the concepts of human security, collaborative security and the framework of the Common African Defence and Security Policy (excuse me for my focus on Africa but this is what I know best) then we need to rethink the roles, functions and postures of our security services. Only once this is done can we reform/transform/restructure to the best effect. I can not go to deeply into this here but would like to mention one example. African military forces have been undergoing many reform/transformation processes, all seemingly to "defend the sovereinty and territorial integrity of the state against some hypothetical enemy". Yet, today with some 3 million men (and I use the term advisedly) under arms, Africa can not supply 20,000 men for peace missions. There must be something seriously wrong with our design parameters.

Mark and Robert in their insightful paper "Buying Time" indicate that in the post conflict environments, the success of SSR in the long run depends on the level of its performance and achievements in the immediate engagement. While this initial engagement or in the words of the authors "Interim Stabilization" is seen as an essential and determining factor to the successful application of SSR in the long term, it is also considered as the most challenging time both in terms of the nature and extent of  operations and tasks involved and the apparent constraints of resources. As in Afghanistan, it may take several years and enormous amount of resources/funding to achieve the minimal enabling conditions for a more structured SSR to take place given that not only there is often no useful physical and institutional infrastructure left, but also there are tremendous impediments in the form of insurgents, IEDs and other contemporary urban-based crimes. The fact that donors are more interested and willing to invest through the Official Development Assistance (ODA), poses a real challenge for SSR programs to sustain its operations. This should be one of the key issues for SSR advocates to address.        

I agree with Len le Roux that engaging local civil society is an important element  Although private actors such as PSCs may be able to address certain elements of SSR (with appropriate regulations in place as mentioned earlier), the involvement of local grassroots organizations which often work towards rebuilding trust and promoting civic education in fragile countries, is essential. For SSR reform to complement other activities in the peacebuilding process it must recognize the importance of local ownership and acceptance.

As Maria Lucia Zapata mentioned earlier, much of what we think of as SSR and peacebuilding today overlaps. There is often no coordination between agenices involved in conflict countries, and processes are repeated or lack the desired impact due to their limited scope. I think this is one of the challenges SSR faces in a post-conflict environment.

Marcela raises a great point. How should SSR programs and practitioners interact with and relate to international military forces in peace-building environments? In some cases like Iraq and Afghanistan, SSR tends to be viewed as a force multiplier, a tool to address immediate security threats, like an insurgency. This has the effect of transforming the process into a Cold War-era train and equip program and undermining the 'soft' aspects of the SSR model, like governance and judicial reform. It is as Walter Slocombe put it, "SSR under fire".

Should international military forces be urged to engage directly in SSR processes or just provide a security buffer for them?

What about the domestic private sector?  SSR experts almost never consult with, nor develop programming alongside the domestic private sector.  The domestic private sector has, in financial terms, the most to gain from peace, and lose in the event of conflict.  The domestic private sector is a segment of civil society which is grossly neglected in SSR programming.  When was the last time the Intl Community and national Governments asked the private sector what kind of security sector is good for business?  The domestic private sector is potentially the real source of future stability - time to bring them in.

Great point Edward. It was raised earlier by David Law. How do you do it? Can you offer some thoughts on how you can engage the domestic private sector in SSR.

The domestic private sector has interests.  Public security is good for business.  Lets ask the domestic private sector what they want.  Surveys, polling, engaging with business associations, and chambers of commerce.  Let us not forget that many in the domestic private sector bankroll domestic political interests, or are one and the same....  My own organisation has sophisticated databases of the private sector in both Timor and Afghanistan, and soon Haiti.  It is not hard to count them, quantify them and seek out their opinions, and advocate, lobby and persuade, all in the self-interest of people interested in jobs and welath creation.

Sorry Mark, but I have to take you up on this. You state that, "The worrying thing about PSC/PMC involement is not the fact that they emanate from the private sector, but that they often bring a military mentality to the process which is not always conducive for SSR implementation". This in my reading stereotypes the military mentality as negative to SSR. I come from a 36 years military carreer and can profess that I and many military practitioners have contributed positively to the SSR debate and the enhancement of human security. The issue is not one of the clothes we wear but of our commitment to the cause. The real issue of PSC/PMC involvement is one of interests. If you are a vendor of security services for profit, does the attainment of security serve your purpose?

Here is some naked advertising.  www.buildingmarkets.org

I agree that the domestic private sector needs to be engaged in the implementation of SSR processes since, as Edward has said, they stand to gain -or lose- depending on the outcomes of such reforms. Two examples come to mind:

1. Business owners can make a commitment to employ demobilized combatants that have resulted from the implementation of DDR programs. It seems simple, but in fact such a commitment is a monumental contribution to the success of SSR and other peacebulding initiatives, since there is often tremendous reluctance to embrace former members of the Security Sector and, hence, their effective and productive reintegration into society is jeopardized. Examples of this can be observed, for instance, in Colombia where the active engagement of the business community is seen as crucial to the success of any DDR initiative.

2. The tourism sector in Haiti is a struggling industry with a lot of potential that has yet to take off with full force. It is undoubtedly in their best interest to help foster an environment that is conducive to a thriving sector, which will be -to a great degree- contingent upon the degree of success of SSR initiatives. I would presume that such industries emanating from the domestic private sector would be quite receptive to being engaged in SSR efforts -even if it entails certain investment (financial, logistical or otherwise)- if the donors and SSR practitioners make an effort to integrate them into the process.

I think one of those things we should also be looking at is how these private sector actors engage the youth in these areas. Most of the risks to security come from the youth but private SSR's often make errors in engaging them. From my personal experience in the Niger Delta, some of these private actors often make the mistake of arming youth and this later goes on to have serious repercussions (as we are seeing today). I think having youth contribute to the security of thier communtiies is important but strict guidelines need to be set up on how to do that.

Mark...in reference to your serial 30 on the role of business and stimulating economic recovery...I think that we should be encouraged to think outside of the box a bit more about how to employ economic growth strategies to facilitate institutional sustainability and confidence in the national 'brand'.  As we progress our thinking on support to SSR policy development, we should also consider skills-sets and activities which support the fiscal elements of wider national security policy.  Where are the rapidly deployable fiscal management consultants and economists?  (Peter, no doubt Libra has some!)

On the 'outside the box' issue, having worked in Haiti, I always found it alarming that SSR efforts there offered little or no direct support to the port authorities and customs officials who were largely responsible for the incoming tax revenue generation.  Following conflict, the national productive capacity of a country becomes badly affected.  This was particularly the case for Haiti, which let to the country importing almost 100% of its goods. 

As for the domestic private security activity, should guidance on this not fall out of the more rigorous national security analysis, in terms of implications for 'economic security'?  This could derive implications for foreign direct investment, regional trade and so on down to local levels.  Such local solutions should also be developed to provide absorptive, logistical and infrastructural capacity to the regional and FDI efforts.    However, the oversight issues involved with this activity remain challenging.  Finance ministries are often latent actors during SSR engagements.  There may be some lessons that could be drawn from the 'Corporate Citizenship' body of literature which was also concerned about the 'local ownership' and 'local participation' issues.  The work surveyed companies doing business in unstable regions (and local groups) to determine how a better business environment could be developed.

Apologies...my last para meant to refer to 'domestic business activity' as opposed to 'domestic private security activity'...

Mark Knight contended earlier that one of the biggest challenges of SSR initiatives is to "simultaneously engage in immediate programmatic interventions...whilst also supporting longer-term process-driven interventions."  Qaseem later on highlighted the importance of interim stabilization, a critical factor that can help inform SSR practitioners in post-conflict settings.

However, Ann Fitz-Gerald notes in her paper "Stabilisation Operations and Post-Conflict SSR: Strange Bedfellows or Close Allies?” that SSR practitioners may easily divorce themselves from issues and ideas relating to stabilisation operations because of what seems to be their different nature in priorities and activities (4).  How can we close the gap between Stabilisation Operations and SSR so that SSR initiatives are not charged with both short-term and the long-term priorities in post-conflict contexts?

Anne-Marie - thank you for opening the debate.  I should just note that my paper agrees with the points raised by both Qaseem and Mark as it acknowledges both similarities and differences between Stabilisation and SSR.

Whilst - in my opinion - there are gaps that cannot be closed, closing some of the gaps might involve the following:  understanding both SSR and Stabilisation in the context of 'instability'; synergising between the many human resource databases supporting each area; acknowleding the political nature of stabilisation (vs the apolitical nature of SSR); and recognising that - in their current form - there is a degree of conflict between the principles supporting each area.  Whilst I fully accept Edward Rees's point at the beginning of the day which drew on the difficulties in either bilateral or multilateral actors leading on SSR, my last two points above support a multilateral lead on post-conflict SSR - but a lead which should be informed by the work of the stabilisation teams which address 'grass roots' issues of conflict - and issues considered important to the development community (ie livelihoods, participation, etc).  However, based on what I have observed with a number of donors, the two communities appear to be developing in their own separate silos.  (Not sure if this is the case for Canada - does anyone know the extent to which START collapses the boundaries between SSR and Stabilisation?)

Like Mark Knight, the other issue for me is the need to ensure that initial post-conflict SSR activity (particularly that which supports the re-development of land forces, police, etc) does not become dominated by the immediate stabilisation requirements.  Perhaps efforts to better socialise the two communities may encourage the much-needed dialogue that merges the short-term with the medium to long-term view.

More than semantics?

Anne's observations were concerned with the conceptual and practical boundaries between SSR and Stabilization, particularly in post-conflict situations. In a similar vein, previous posts by Karolina and Maria Lucia addressed the question of what, if any, the fundamental differences between SSR and Peacebuilding are, and stressed the fact that several areas of these frameworks appear to overlap.

Since these terms seem to often be used interchangeably, I would ask:

Is there real clarity among researchers and practitioners about the actual theoretical boundaries between SSR, Stabilization and Peacebuilding? Can these be unequivocally drawn?

If so, what then is the difference? Is the difference between SSR and Peacebuilding a matter of scope - Peacebuilding being broader than SSR? If that is the case and SSR is narrower in scope, how did the private sector and business community topics find their way into our disccussion of the Security Sector?

Is the difference between SSR and Stabilization a matter of sequencing - Stabilization occurring before SSR?

While we're at it, is the difference between Security Sector Reform and Security System Reform more than mere semantics?

The question posed by Mark on the role of the military (engaged in SSR or being only a buffer) is quite difficult. While I would tend to say that they must only be a security umbrella, providing a stable and secure environment as the UN mandates use to provide, experiences and testimonies from peacekeepers vary. The issue of civil-military cooperation or coordination in a conflict or post-conflict environment is bein really discussed nowadays. For instance, which is the role of peacekeepers and what about the humanitarian agencies? I am really not an expert on this, but I do see that this kind of issues will need deeper research and debate in the next years.

Cesar, I was thinking about this exact question while reading today's earlier posts. I think we cannot talk about engaging the private sector, including domestic, in security sector reform if security in and of itself cannot be ensured. I am reminded of day one's discussion and the mention of a continuum - sequencing plays a big part of this process. How can sustainable instutions be built in an environment that is volatile? Stabilization is crucial if we are to then talk about reform.

One of today's discussion questions (Can SSR be successfully implemented in areas facing high levels of insecurity?) lies at the heart of the SSR vs. Stabilization debate. If these are in fact different processes, must we assume that SSR programs cannot commence until the security situation has improved? Conversely, can they operate simultaneously? In other words, can SSR be effective 'under fire' or is Stabilization a fundamental prerequisite?

I would add to Cesar Jaramillo´s comment latest comment (#43):  what will be the role, if any, of peacebuilding initiatives and operations?

Len, on your point in post 32, I did not intend to disparage the military and their role in SSR. I was merely attempting to emphasize that the implementation of SSR requires a wide range of expertise, from both the civilian and military spheres. My experience is that PSCs are often heavy on military expertise and light on civilian SSR capacity. Just as I don't think it would be appropriate to send policeman to train soldiers (bringing a 'civilian mentality' to a policing situation, so to speak), I think it is counterproductive for former and current soldiers to be charged with the task of training police or Ministry of Interior officials. But that is precisely what is happening in Afghanistan, partly under the authority of PSCs, where much of the Afghan National Police have been trained by current and former U.S. soldiers and the transformation of the Ministry of Interior is being led by a U.S. military body. The US Coalition Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A) leading Afghan security force development, also has military personnel working on judicial reform and institutional transformation.

 SSR requires a range of expertise, a rational division of labour. If one area is overrepresented it can skew the entire process and undermine its long-term effectiveness. It gets back to the issue of SSR securitization/militarization raised in the first few days of the conference.

Before the discussion concludes for the day, I wanted to address a recurring point that I have had trouble with. In post #2, Jessica Teeple mentioned that "SSR programs seem to focus on the political aspects more than the technical assistance parts." In post #39, Ann Fitz-Gerald refers to "the apolitical nature of SSR". I would take the opposite position on both counts. In my view, one of the reasons SSR has failed in many contexts is that SSR practitioners have not properly grasped or engaged with the political dynamics of SSR. They have treated it as a technocratic exercise rather than the deeply contentious political process that is. There is no more political sector of the state than the security sector. The SSR process will inevitably create winners and losers (many of whom become spoilers) and alter the existing balance of power. Ensuring that this restructuring of power relations does not undermine the peace, requires a complex set of political negotiation and bargaining at the elite and societal levels.

Of course parts of the SSR process are very technical, but such assistance will not bear fruit unless the political cards are in order. Accordingly, I would argue not that the nature and sophistication of SSR technical assistance is the problem -- international donors have become fairly good at training police and revising legal codes, among other things--rather I would argue that it is our seeming inability to adequately understand and engage local political realities in SSR implementation settings. It is that apolitical approach to SSR that is , in fact, the problem!

Let me briefly address the question raised by Marcia, Cesar and Agata, on the differences between SSR and peace-building. Of course the two concepts overlap, as do a number of other developmental and political processes under the auspices of post-conflict reconstruction. SSR can be conceptualized as part of the wider peace-building agenda. While SSR focuses exclusively on the reform/transformation of the security and justice architecture of the state, the peace-building agenda also deals with a range of related issues from political reconciliation, to economic development and transitional justice.  The SSR process may delve into these issues, but only when they relate to the security sphere. For instance, our discussion on the private sector and SSR did not discuss how to stimulate private sector investment or restore macroeconomic stability as a means to restore social order; it revolved around how private sector actors, both local and international, can assist in reforms to the security sector.

As for stabilization missions, their mandate interfaces with SSR but moves far beyond it. Most peacekeeping and stabilization operations, such as MINUSTAH in Haiti, have, as part of their mandate, a role in strengthening the local security sector. After all this is part of their exit strategy. However, their main role and responsibility is to create an enabling environment for the implementation of reforms and institution building. There is a symbiotic relationship between SSR and stabilization missions, but they are not one in the same.

However, the question of boundaries between peace-building and SSR does highlight a problem with the SSR model, the continued broadening of the concept. The heaping of responsibilities and tasks on it is blurring the meaning of SSR. Moreover, as Cesar mentioned there isn't even a consensus on SSR terminology. To ensure that SSR means something rather than everything there may be a need to further narrow down the concept.

e-CONFERENCE DAY 4 SUMMARY

Today’s session on SSR & Peace-Building primarily focused primarily on the role of the private sector and the overlap between peace-building, stabilization operations, and SSR.  Below is a summary of the major themes discussed:

The Role of the Private Sector in SSR

A dominant theme of the discussion was the role of the private sector in SSR. Edouard Belloncle of Saferworld provided three main categories of private sector actors: small to medium sized companies who consult; large management firms with extensive human and financial capacity involved in programming; and private military and security companies (PMCs & PSCs) engaged in direct security and technical assistance. While most participants recognized the positive role that the private sector can play in the SSR process, particularly in its contribution of vital technical assistance, several participants sounded a note of caution about relying too much on private sector actors. Len Le Roux, of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in South Africa, remarked that with most private sector actors engaged in SSR emanating from the North, they could lack the necessary contextual knowledge to engage in Southern cases and could potentially accentuate local ownership gaps. Addressing this dilemma of ownership, Edward Rees of the Peace Dividend Trust urged participants to consider the role of the domestic private sector in SSR processes. After all, the “… the domestic private sector has, in financial terms, the most to gain from peace, and lose in the event of conflict .” 

e-CONFERENCE DAY 4 SUMMARY, PART TWO

Private Security Companies and SSR

The involvement of PMCs and PSCs in SSR sparked a lively debate. Some participants identified the shortcomings of PMCs/PSCs in engaging with SSR, namely their predominantly military focus and concomitant lack of civilian expertise in a wide array of SSR priority areas. In light of the need for rapidly deployable technical expertise, other participants argued that they meet an urgent and indispensible need. A consensus did seem to be reached on the need for a clearly defined mandate and robust oversight mechanisms.  

Peace-building, Stabilization, and SSR

Another prominent theme touched upon at numerous points in today’s discussion was the relationship between SSR, peace-building processes and stabilization operations. Participants explored how to close the gaps between these three pillars and foster a more complimentary and mutually reinforcing relationship between them. Ann Fitz-Gerald of Cranfield University, and author of one of today’s papers, noted that “there are gaps that cannot be closed, closing some of the gaps might involve … understanding both SSR and Stabilization in the context of 'instability'; synergizing between the many human resource databases supporting each area; acknowledging the political nature of stabilization … and recognizing that - in their current form - there is a degree of conflict between the principles supporting each area.”

LOOKING AHEAD TO DAY 5

Tomorrow’s discussion will focus on the C hallenges to SSR Implementation . Among the questions we hope to address are:

• What are the most significant challenges to the SSR model?
• Is the SSR model in its current form capable of overcoming these challenges?
• How have the preeminent challenges to the SSR model shaped the manner in which it has been implemented?
• Has the international community taken the necessary steps to overcome the challenges to the SSR model, both at the policy and programmatic levels? If not, what should it be doing?