The Challenge of Engaging Non-State/Traditional Justice Systems

Posted on behalf of Deborah Isser, Senior Rule of Law Advisor, United States Institute of Peace (USIP)
 
I agree very much with Mark Sedra's comments during Day 1regarding the importance of engaging traditional justice systems to form complimentary relationships with the formal system.  I limit my comments -- as is my experience -- to the justice system, rather than policing -- although I recognize that these are inherently related.  I would add a few points to those already made by Baker, Sedra and others (and forgive me if I am repeating).
 
Most fundamentally, ignoring traditional justice systems in the interest of promoting state institutions has a lot of risks.  Precisely because this is a political question it needs to be managed carefully.  There may well be a history of state suppression of traditional systems that was a critical source and/or manifestation of the conflict (e.g. Guatemala, Mozambique, South Sudan); or careful balance struck between central institutions and the periphery (e.g. Afghanistan).  An attempt to replace traditional justice systems with a state monopoly in such cases can be counter to the goal of dealing with the sources of conflict and may exacerbate political and/or ethnic tensions.
 
As has been pointed out, another risk -- this one more benign -- is that SSR strategies that deal exclusively with state actors may prove to have zero impact on the vast majority of the population who rely -- and always have -- on traditional systems.

Part 2 – Deborah Isser (USIP)

On a practical level, for international actors who work outside the capital, the right question is not whether they should engage with traditional systems, but how they should do so. In East Timor despite the fact that UNTAET had no policy regarding customary justice, CIVPOL and other field officers inevitably bumped into them and had to develop their own ad hoc policies. In Liberia human rights officers found themselves in the middle of witch trials.  And in Southern Sudan UNPOL discovered that the customary chiefs were the only ones capable of resolving disputes.  Not having a strategy means ad hoc responses and often ones that either are ineffective or that cause harm.
 
For example, the human rights officer in Liberia who found himself in the middle of a witch trial was laughed out of the circle when he tried to explain that there was no such thing as witches and that this violated the ICCPR. This didn't do much for the legitimacy of UNMIL or the government. In fact, following a state ban on trial by ordeal, many rural Liberians blame the government for an uncontrollable increase in crime and witchcraft.  In Sudan the unpol who told the chief that he was not allowed to handle a murder case discovered that the village was swept up in a cycle of blood vengeance that could not be stopped by a statutory court.  In East Timor the civpol who took a murder perpetrator to detention in the capital found the victim's family pleading for his release as they felt it terribly unfair that the perpetrator was well fed in jail rather than made to apologize and provide compensation to the victim's family.

Part 3 – Deborah Isser (USIP)

I am not suggesting that we should accept all social practices and beliefs even if they violate international norms. However, (1) we must understand them and develop more nuanced ways of trying to bridge gaps; (2) we must accept that there are positive values in traditional systems that represent an alternative paradigm and not just a poor substitute to a western formal system.
 
So what can we (donors/practitioners) do?  First I would suggest that the goal be to foster a constructive relationship between the formal and traditional systems that in the immediate term provides increased access to justice, taking into account realities on the ground regarding capacity and alternatives, social beliefs and conceptions of justice, and in the longer term allows for a legitimate process of determining the ultimate role of the traditional system within the justice system.  I suggest some practical ways of doing this below:

Part 4 – Deborah Isser (USIP)

The first step must be to dedicate resources to assessing the customary justice systems. Such an assessment must be contextual and empirical. These systems need to be studied as part of the political and socio-cultural environments in which they operate so as to understand their internal logic, the perceptions of the people they serve, and the potential consequences of different reform strategies. Moreover, they should be assessed not through a comparison to an idealized formal system, but through an examination of the actual practice and experience of the population with both the formal system and the customary or non-state justice systems.  Among the issues that should be assessed:

- the internal logic of the customary system, which includes understanding the socio-cultural context in which it operates, and internal accountability mechanisms;

- the manner in which it resolves criminal cases and the types of resolutions it reaches;

- the types of cases it is capable of solving, and those beyond its reach;

- the degree of support and legitimacy it enjoys among the people it serves, relative to that enjoyed by the formal system;

- the nature of practices that violate formal laws and international norms; and

- the relationship between the customary and formal systems from a historical and political perspective.

Part 5 – Deborah Isser (USIP)

Immediate access to justice:  Where the formal system has limited reach, criminal justice advisers should consider ways to engage with customary justice systems to improve the experience of the population in criminal justice.  Programmatic options might include:

- Strengthening the accountability of customary justice authorities to the communities they serve.  This might involve the following types of activities:

- restoring internal accountability mechanisms, such as methods for selecting customary justice authorities and the possibility of appeal to higher authorities, where such mechanisms have been distorted;

- training customary justice authorities in mediation techniques and familiarizing them with formal law and international standards;

- empowering parties to criminal disputes to insist on just results by making them aware of their rights, both under customary and formal law, or training community members to help advocate for women and vulnerable people;

- encouraging the recording of cases and their resolution so as to promote consistency of decisions and provide a basis for appeal.

Part 6 – Deborah Isser (USIP)

Improving linkages between the formal and customary justice systems on criminal matters.  While resolving the relationship between the two systems is a question for the longer term, it may be possible to improve matters on a local level in the immediate term.  Programmatic options might include:

- working with customary authorities and state actors on a local level to set out appropriate criteria for determining when criminal matters might be left to customary authorities so as to avoid overlapping jurisdiction and double jeopardy;

- working with customary authorities, state actors and civil society to incorporate restorative principles of compensation and reconciliation in state prosecuted criminal cases.

Part 7 – Deborah Isser (USIP)

Working to mitigate harmful practices:  One of the more challenging issues is how to bring customary justice systems in line with international human rights norms and standards.  Top-down prohibitions tend to be ineffective at best, and counter-productive at worst.  While developing progressive legislation is a positive step, it is important not to overestimate the ability of law to change deep-seated beliefs and cultural practices.  Programmatic options should be aimed at protecting the vulnerable and promoting change from within, such as by:

- working with communities to encourage the development of culturally acceptable alternatives to harmful practices;

- developing meaningful alternatives for those who are victims of harmful practices and violations of international standards by customary justice systems, for example, by providing legal aid and additional resources to enable them to access the formal system.

Part 8 – Deborah Isser (USIP)

Longer-term justice reform: Over the longer-term, criminal justice advisers should aim to promote a constructive process of engagement between the formal and customary justice systems to enable informed and acceptable decisions regarding their integration.  Often the two systems are pitted against each other as undesired competition.  From the perspective of many formal system actors, the customary system may be seen as anachronistic and primitive and should simply be phased out.  From the perspective of many constituents of the customary system, the formal system may be regarded as an unwanted intrusion on their values, especially where there is a history of tension between the central state and the periphery.  In order to avoid this being a point of tension that may erode the legitimacy of the formal system in the eyes of much of the population, programmatic options should seek to establish a constructive relationship between the two systems and an inclusive process for determining the role of the customary system in the future.  This might include:

- promoting dialogue between customary authorities, the local population and formal system actors to promote mutual understanding and respect, to identify problems in the relationship between the formal and customary system and to design potential solutions;

- ensuring that the policy-making process is informed not only by legal ideals, but also by the realities on the ground and potential consequences of various policy options;

- drawing on comparative examples from other countries that have struggled with the integration of the formal and customary systems to help design possible models of integration.

Congratulations to William Byrd on the very good paper on the financial dimention of SSR. I believe that this dimention is often overlooked and this hampers sustainability of SSR results. From my own experiences in the South African defence transformation process I can attest to the important role played in defence transformation by other departments of state, not usually accociated with SSR. Firstly, one of the first acts that was produced in post-apartheid SA, was the public finance management act (PFMA). This act prescribed to all departments of state the processes for budgeting and financial acountability. The advantage of this was that it empowered the Treasury in its control and oversight function and directed the development of healthy management processes and practises in the Department of Defence and other departments. The same is true for the Public Service Act (PSA) developed by the Department of Public Service Administration. This also prescribed good management practise in strategic planning, human resource management and reporting requirements. Through these acts the playing field was leveled so that all state departments were subject to the same rules and requirements. Thus no special rules for the security services.

This emphasises that SSR can only be conducted successfully within a broader context of governance reform. I believe that all too often SSR is conducted in a vacuum and this normally creates problems of sustainability down the line. I suppose that this brings its own complications to an already complicated process, but the creation of a financial and public service legislative framework must be factored in when planning SSR.

I agree with the points raised by Deborah Isser with regard to constructing a relationship between customary and formal justice systems. Bringing customary justice system in accordance with international human rights is indeed a fundamental challenge to justice reform. The local context however can not be ignored when we consider bridging the gap between international standards of justice and customary practices. As pointed out by Mark Sedra in his paper,' Narrowing the Policy-Practice Divide', dismantling the traditional or informal justice system to simply replace it with formal justice system is reflective of the inflexibility of the SSR approach to take the local context into account. Considering the fact that the informal justice system is perceived as legitimate and more effective by the local population in the recipient country , it is crucial to integrate traditional justice systems in the reform process, especially when sustainability is desired.

I would like to echo Len le Roux on the importance of the financial side of SSR, very well brought out in the paper by William Byrd. While it is not impossible to downsize a reformed SSR sector to a countries financial means - Bosnia-Hercegovina comes to mind as a case at least going into that direction - there is a tendency to postpone hard decisions on finanancial sustainability in SSR. Unfortunately this tendency is particularly strong where SSR has the main objective to provide for an "exit strategy" for external actors, as in Afghanistan or Iraq. Donors are in danger of repeating a mistake almost universally made by colonial powers (one of the many) who left newly emerging states with well organized (except in the Belgian case) but very expensive mlitary sectors. Unsurprisingly, we had a large number of military dictatorships within a short time after independence.

Zeenia, I agree that it's critical to acknowledge and maintain customary practices in post-conflict contexts, especially when these traditional and customary mechanisms have assisted in sustaining the social fabric of that society. However, I wonder if we are spreading SSR priorities too thinly. We ask SSR to be implemented in a human rights context, ensure local ownership and respect local cultures, in many instances help stabilize the situation on the ground, implement strong institutions yet also respect customary mechanisms, and ensure there is democratic oversight to the security sector. Is this all possible? What would the sequencing be to all these priorities? Are we asking too much of SSR practitioners?  

Thank you Deborah for your comments regarding traditional justice systems. I think it addresses most of the challenges that donors, communities and policy makers have to face in its implementation. Colombia is another country that has encouraged traditional justice systems for certain type of cases. Moreover, its National Constitution integrated community justice mechanisms such as justice of the peace and equity conciliation ( jueces de paz y conciliadores en equidad). The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Justice, as well as a number of municipalities have adopted community justice into their programs.

Despite the importance of these mechanisms and its legitimacy in the community, one of the most important challenges they have to face is the increase regulation (formalization) of the mechanism that threatens its effectiveness. In addition, despite the effort for understanding "the internal logic of the customary system, which includes understanding the socio-cultural context in which it operates", as Deborah highlights, it seems to me that foreign standards and models, especially through Alternative Dispute Mechanism models (ADR) have been introduced delegitimazing the tradition that made these mechanisms effective in the first place.

Len and Michael make superb points. I think the issue of financial sustainability is an oft overlooked, but vital aspect of SSR. In no case is this more apparent than Afghanistan, where spending in the security sector has ranged from 300-500% of state revenues over the past 5 years. And this does not include 'off-book' expenditures by several donors like the United States. The Afghan government and every single major stakeholder in the SSR process admit that this is wholly unsustainable, yet no action has been taken. This is all the more disturbing because if you look at the history of the Afghan state, traditionally a rentier state, you can detect a familiar pattern. When external rents (subsidies/aid) to the state have been curtailed or cut off, making it impossible for it to sustain its security forces, a breakdown of the security institutions has resulted, inevitably followed by the overall disintegration of state authority. I fear that this pattern may play out again in Afghanistan once international assistance to the Afghan state invariably recedes in the years ahead. Even if the most optimistic projections concerning state revenue are met in the years ahead, the Afghan state will not be able to maintain current spending levels in the security sector without massive external subsidies for years to come. The consequences for the Afghanistan are catstrophic.

Rather than creating a fiscally sustainable and self-reliant security sector, the SSR process in Afghanistan is creating an external dependency.

Let me also play devil's advocate here on the sustainability question. In a post-conflict society, where the needs of the security sector are immense and internal revenue generating capacity virtually non-existent, almost all reforms could be categorized as unsustainable. In these cases there is little a donor can do in reforming/creating the basic security and justice architecture of the state but to spend in an unsustainable fashion.

How can this problem be overcome?

Documents posted on behalf of Benjamin Buckland, research assistant of special progammes at the Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces:

Security Sector Governance and Reform (will open in new window)

SSR in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (will open in new window)

In a round-about way to address Anne-Marie's question about sequencing, I'd like us to remember that decisions about SSR priorities are political decisions. 

As someone who is interested in power relationships and the role women currently play and could play in SSR, this is an important question for me most of the time. Decisions cannot be separated from decision-makers.  If security institutions - formal or informal - are overwhelmingly populated by men, it will likely be more difficult for them to develop policy and practice that respects the rights and agency of women.  Empowerment is just as important as protection.

On Mark's tough question, I was thinking this morning about short term investments working contrary to long-term goals.  I don't have a quick answer to the question, but I think part of it is about linking short-term investments in stability with longer-term goals of democratization and building a functioning state.  I come back to political decisions and to promoting gender equality even during stabilization efforts.  Who decides that heavy investment in the military is a greater priority that creating safe, secure access to water points or for girls to walk to and from school?

Regarding Mark Sedra's comment and question in post #15. I think that there is no way to spend sustainably at the beginning of the SSR process in a post-conflict society. Unsustainable spending must, for at least a short period, be part of the program. SSR is a long-term process, and like most long-term plans, it needs a kick-start with high levels of spending in order to get off the ground. Although this is not a prescription per se, after the first three or five years of the SSR program being in effect, this is when donors and local entities should review the spending patterns and work at making spending sustainable. If not sustainable, a least closer to sustainable than before. (If they cannot reach sustainability in the first five years, a review of spending patterns should be done on a year basis following that, brining the spending closer and closer to sustainability.) So, the problem of unsustainable spending cannot be overcome initially, but in long-term SSR programs the 'unsustainable portion' of the SSR plan should be very short term (3-5 years) and only occur at the beginning of the process. 

No easy answers to the sustainability question, Mark. On a rather technical level I can contribute some pointers, based much on the defence/military model. Firstly when designing the future military (and I suppose other security service) I would advise using a "needs driven but cost-constrained" approach. This forces planners to face reality and not to simply dream about ideal solutions which are not affordable. Secondly, a lot of effort must be put into the determination of 'life cycle costs'. All to often planners calculate their budgets on what exists and what is needed to keep it running for the next few years. This however ignores renewal, upgrading and reploacement costs and that is why the wheels come off in the slightly longer term. Thirdly I would stress the need for short-, medium- and long-term plans and well thought out migration plans from the one to the other. In Jeff's paper he talks of the importance of sequencing SSR and I think that a long-term approach with good migration planning can contribute to this. How one prioritises this can only be determined on a case by case basis. And then lastly, I believe that much more effort should be put into efficiency improvement (basically getting more bang for the buck.) If we look at military (and police) rank inflation in Africa, perks to senior officials, the lack of coordination between security services etc, there certainly is scope for improvement.

I think that donors also need to interrogate these issues when engaging in SSR support and bring the message of the need for efficiency accross. Let me end off with a question that I think we should also ask, "why is it that certain countries can sustain conflict for many years but heve no resources of their own for post-conflict peacebuilding?"

Jennifer, I would tend to agree with you. From the beginning of the process a balance must be sought between short, medium and long-term priorities. For instance, if you view gender as a long-term priority, only to be addressed after the security forces are trained and equipped than a tremendous opportunity would be missed to advance change at a formative and malleable stage of the process. Moreover, compartmentalizing the process as such permits the hardening of  pathologies and practices inimical to the goals of SSR.

I don't like speaking about "post-conflict moments" because it promotes a blank slate mentality, which is unhelpful for the contextualization of reforms. However, I think there are opportunities for change early in the post-conflict/transition process that could close as it develops.

Maria, it is interesting to hear about the situation in Colombia (post #13).  I completely agree with you that some efforts to engage customary systems can result in distorting them and taking away their key advantages.  Especially in fragile societies where the formal system is a shambles itself and hardly capable of better regulating any kind of customary law.  I think we need to be careful of the goal of "incorporation" of customary systems into formal ones.  Lots to learn about this from colonial and post-colonial experiments.  At least in the medium term period of post-conflict or fragile societies I think the key should not be to create a single incorporated system, but to focus on better linkages and ways to improve access to justice.  Ultimately, justice and security sector reform is a process, not an event.  As foreign actors we tend to like to see things happen immediately.  But change will have to come from social development as well as the availability of real alternatives.  Forum shopping here can be a good thing -- as alternatives are available, this can put pressure on the customary system itself to reform too.

I would like to relate the question of sustainability to the issue of local ownership. There is clearly a relationship between these two concepts, albeit not a direct one. In other words, even if the country undergoing SSR processes lacks the resources for long-term sustainable spending, it doesn't mean that local capacity cannot be gradually built and thus allow for the (partial) disengagement of the international community as local actors take the reins of their own processes. They would still require international financial assistance, of course, but the physical presence of foreign personnel could be greatly reduced as domestic human and institutional capacity is developed and local ownership nurtured.

Mark, agreed on opportunities for change & a limited window for them.

I also agree with Cesar about the link between sustainability and local ownership. I think that link is strongest with respect to creating indigenous demand and political will for continued reform processes.  The tricky part for me is the question raised by many, including some of the paper/presentation contributors:  which locals?  There may need to be a role for donors and international civil society to push local authorities to create space for marginalized groups to participate in the reform process.

Great question Jennifer. Let me take this a step further and open it the group. H ow should donors provide space and entry points for the engagement of a wide range of local actors? What are some strategies that donors can take in different contexts?

I have another broad question for all our participants:

One thing that the e-Conference has clearly shown is that there is a tremendous need for further applied research on the concept and its implementation in different settings.

CIGI, like other organizations will be investing significantly in this area over the coming years. This brings me to my question: What areas/issues of SSR do you think are in most need of research and exploration? 

Deborah Isser has quite extensively covered the issue of formal vs. informal or traditional systems. She is right in that there are numerous great values and practices in the traditional systems that any reform program should take into account and further encourage.

It is also true, unfortunately, that often the traditional systems include certain practices and behaviours that are not only in direct violation of human rights and other modern international norms, but can have serious repercussions for people.

In Afghanistan for example, (sorry, this is just where I work and am focused at present), practices such as "badal" (a return for a crime or damage committed) which involve forced marriage of young girls or direct execution (commonly carried out by Taliban), are quite serious issues. 

Because state justice institutions are weak with very little capacities or in some cases are deeply corrupt (especially) in the provinces, often formal justice systems fail to timely respond to different requests or cases. This situation forces residents of a particular area to turn to informal justice service providers like "Meshran" community elders, "Shuras" (community councils), or in volatile areas where the government has no or less presence, to Taliban or Warlords.     

Now, as Deborah describes, any reform model such as SSR, will need to have a multi-faceted approach to dealiing with informal systems because while on one hand it will undertake institutional reforms (establishing courts, providing the necessary infrastructure, ensuring protection for judges etc) and on the other hand it will work with people (through education programs, social outreach etc)ensuring they use formal systems . Of course, as we all discussed yesterday, SSR program will need to ensure that it has adequate resources in the early stage to combat the "UNPREDICTABLES" associated with any post conflict early intervention.    

My question is coming below!

The question now is how to (a SSR program) distinguish between the good practices and the bad ones and how should the bad ones be re-introduced as bad ones. For one, it is clear that this will require time, resources and the readiness to confront the associated risks.  

Mark, to answer your question in post 24, from my perspective, it is fatal to eliminate completely the local actors that were involved prior to the SSR process being initiated.  We have seen this happen in many instances, including Iraq, where doing so has led to further instability.  In sequencing, continuity should be considered as a viable option to a certain degree as the process is aimed towards reform rather than reboot.  The donors thus should create a way to include existing local actors and help them navigate towards a new and more sustainable direction.

The question of sustainability which has arisen is something we can consider from a different perspective.  The idea that donor countries are there to assist with the reformation process needs to be thought of as a long term benefit for the donor and the global stage.  With that outlook, the initial spending can be considered as an investment, rather than a charity, so that later benefits of a stable ad sustainable security system in the recipient country can be fruitful for the locals and in turn for the international community.

The goal again should not be to dismantle the existing structures that generate revenue, but rather to gradually phase into the new models of sustainable revenue growth and security.

Mark, on your question in post 24, I have often argued that conditionality is inherent in donor support. The question is however, "what form of conditionality?" The earlier forms of 2% conditionality and other prescriptive outcomes obviously failed and led to much disgruntlement with SSR and donors. On the other hand, process conditionality is to my mind a must. Donors must make it clear that if they are to support SSR and SSR implementation in the short to longer term, the process must be transparent, inclusive and participative. They should therefore insist on the involvement of local civil society and grass roots organisations.

Your post 25 question on areas/issues of SSR in the most need for research, three issues come to mind. Firstly we have really not yet touched of the area of intelligence reform. There is some work on this currently ongoing in South Africa but a lot remains to be explored. Secondly the issue of SSR towards a collaborative security paradigm. How do we conduct SSR on a national basis but to also address the needs for collaborative security? How do we factor organised transnational crime, arms smuggling, human trafficing and other trans-border threats to human security into SSR processes. Lastly, coming back to what I know best, I believe that we need to really rethink the roles, functions and postures of military forces so that they can be designed to serve both national and human security and at the same time contribute to collaborative security. In the case of Africa, we can ill afford militaries designed to "defend the sovereinty and territorial integrity of the state in times of war" with no or little capacity to support the peace-building and development exigencies of our times.

Posted on behalf of Wolf E. Poulet, SSR Consultant with Result Group Corp:

Having read William Byrd´s , Marina Caparini´s and Eirin Mobekk´s excellent papers I would like to forward some commentaries to the "Challenges of Ownership." I couldn´t agree more "that unless there is a local ownership of SSR-processes they will not succeed." The paper explains very well the definitions of ownership, be it "local"or "national", and also the discrepancy between these levels. My critical commentary would be aimed at the relation of "Donors versus Locals" - maybe both terms are used too narrow as a physical value, understimating the "human factor".

If SSR is still based on a "westernized view" - which is obviously the case - and the major objective is to meet "donor requirements," SSR-processes will be ihn vain. Meanwhile, the Global Governance Nexus has started type of a power change/shift from West to East, towards the Asian, African and Latinamerican countries.The catastrophic loss of western values during the late US government, mainly because of the incredible policy of "double standards" (to put it mildly), has not enhanced, primarily not in fragile states, the political will to undergo SSR-processes, according to the OECD regulations. As far as I understand the OECD SSR-Handbook,however, it will be the task of donors and/or international institutions to create conditions for, to support, to explain the advantages of SSR in a subtle and careful approach.

Part 2 - Wolf E. Poulet

"Externals who have problems to accept local solutions," probably have forgotten that SSR is not implementable with a blueprint - they just do not exist.When externals "have their own objectives and goals for SSR", they better should give up the job and look out for more intercultural competency. If externals are "focussing on immediate outputs,( may be understandable),but this strategy (is this a strategy at all?) "has failed time and time again." When "SSR practitioners have raised arguments against local ownership because in fragile and post-conflict states there are such low levels of capacity that it makes ownership very difficult" - do they still know, beyond their own personal time-frames, what they want to change and support? Starting and feeding SSR-processes may take 5, 10, 15 or 20 years, interruptions are expectable, and therefore the most important factor would be: stay by your client, keep your empathy and safeguard the funds for the mid- and long-term action.
If "civil socierty" is excluded because of lack of expertise in security matters", this is clearly a white lie, mostly used by military and police forces who intend to push back civil control over their corrupt handling of a public good. In this case the external should find smart approaches with members of the civil society, in order to overcome these frictions.

Part 3 - Wolf E. Poulet

This means for the donors: provide for a clear selection which state/societal elites in country A, B or C are willing to assume ownership - support them.Give them a second and third chance. Maybe consider also to help the losers and spoilers. If all this wouldn´t work, let´s get out of this country abd support others who ask for help - our ressources are limited as well.

For my understanding we are still not patient enough to provide effective SSR-support. This is the most significant challenge to SSR in general: help to create and perform the ownership of the "locals" - despite this will be very time-consuming.

And of course, SSR is capable of overcoming these (and other) challenges. Fragile countries, however, are not "laboratories" for eager practitioners and politicians under time pressure - every SSR-process is such a highly complex live action that in any case a single approach seems to be inevitable.(Look also at Edward Rees ‘study on "misunderstandings", e.g. in East-Timor PKO.)

Len, thanks for your insightful comment and great suggestions on research topics. Let me pick up on the issue of conditionality, which I think is very important. Conditionality has become a bad word in the development field, primarily due to its relationship to WB/IMF neo-liberal structural adjustment policies, but I believe it is critical for the success of SSR programs. It is important to note that the conditionality relationship must be two way. Just as aid recipients are responsible to live up to the mutually negotiated principles and guidelines of a reform project, the donors are bound to uphold their funding and support commitments if those guidelines are met. Conditionality regularizes and systematizes the donor-recipient relationship. All sides know the rules of the game and how to proceed when they breakdown.

An unconditional approach to assistance, as we see in many SSR contexts, fosters recipient manipulation of donors (such as playing one donor off against another) and encourages short-termist donor programming. Creating conditionality frameworks surrounding donor programs is a step for donors towards adopting the necessary long-term outlook for SSR.

Which local actors?

Ghazanfar is right (post 28) when he argues that an effort must be made to engage existing local actors in the implementation of SSR programs. Indeed, while sometimes it may be necessary, donor countries and SSR practitioners should avoid adopting by default a 'clean slate' approach to the reform efforts.

Moreover, existing local actors that should be engaged in the process do not solely include those within formal institutions, but also traditional figures of authority whose political clout and ability to mobilize their constituency can very well shape the direction of SSR programs and influence their likelihood of success. This is true even for individuals and organizations whose record is tainted with questionable human rights practices in the past for, if they are not incorporated into the process, they may have the wherewithal to derail SSR programs.

Admittedly this may be hard to swallow and seem counterintutive in a process that has human rights as one of its pillars. Still, in some contexts, particularly in the initial stages of SSR, it can be considered a 'lesser evil' compared to the potential capacity of disenfranchised actors to spoil the process.

Sustainability

The issue of sustainability is a thorny one. However, I believe it can be regarded as a by-product of successful SSR implementation and, in fact, as a measure of its success. Going back to yesterday's discussion of the stake of the local private sector and business community in SSR success, one would expect that, as conditions in the country improve, so too an environment will be (slowly) created for the business sector to thrive and contribute to the generation of local revenue.

This will not happen overnight. As we can see in Haiti with the presence of MINUSTAH, the arguments for sustainability and avoinding dependence on foreign aid cannot override the reality that SSR processes in the country are not yet self-sustainable and the nation cannot be left to its own devices.

Wolf E. Poulet makes a good point that reform will not be instantaneous and will sometimes take many years or decades. Also, that civil society is one of the actors that can perform oversight.  However, to look at it from a "human" perspective which is sometimes driven by media and sometimes driven by political cycles, among other things, how can one justify engagement of a donor country for a period that "seems" infinite? This is seen by the public demands and media outcry for disengagement in countries that are assisting Afghanistan, for instance. 

At the same time, given that we have had previous learning experiences, and recognizing that each situation is unique, can the SSR process not be designed to have some immediate impact on the ground that will satisfy the human urge for accomplishment?

In response to Mark Sedra’s earlier question on the need to expand SSR research, I believe the most crucial area is in conflict prevention. The need for SSR programmes in post-conflict societies is quite obvious and in countries where an effective security sector operates under democratic control, SSR may be redundant. In countries on the brink, SSR has contributed to prevention of conflict. Solutions to problems that SSR currently faces (including time inconsistencies, local ownership, and sustainability) may be more easily found in states implementing programmes aimed at maintaining peace. As Walter Slocombe stated in his keynote address, SSR is complicated by the fact that it is conducted ‘under fire’. Perhaps conducting these programmes before the shots begin would mean solutions would become more apparent. The goal of broader SSR policy prescriptions should be preventative rather than reactionary and I believe SSR research should expand to meet this objective.

on the first day of the conference I posted some questions I hoped would be answered, or at least addressed.  I have not had time to read all the posts to see if in fact they were addressed or possibly answered.  My questions were: 1 what are the benchmarks of success.  In other words how is success recognized?  2.  What are the interdependencies for SSR.  These interdependencies are neccessary to identify so work around solutions can be developed.  As one who studies critical infrastructures I can not beging to stress the importantance of interdependency identification.

Aaron Widdis wrote that he felt conflict prevention was the most critical area SSR research.  I do not disagree. I will add I feel that when societies have secure infrastructures, such as transportation, medical, agriculture, electrical, financial, legal, and educationalthen you will see an significant reduction in conflict prevention.

Ghazanfar Sukkurwala  adressed the current situation in Afghanistan which is a country that illustrates my point.  The question then becomes how do you get warring factions to caese hostilities.  Perhaps one way is to point out to both parties involved the benefits of prosperity.  I guarentee a farmer would rather live in a country where he could safely raise his family in peace and prosperity than fight in a war he is either paid to or coereced.

Be well, do good work and stay in touch

e-CONFERENCE SUMMARY - DAY 5 (part two)

SSR Sustainability

The challenge of designing SSR programs that are financially sustainable dominated the session. There were participants such as Jessica Teeple from the Balsillie School of International Affairs, who questioned the plausibility of designing financially sustainable reform programs in fragile state and post-conflict societies where the scale of the reform needs is only matched by the scarcity of resources to address them. In light of such conditions, “unsustainable spending must, for at least a short period, be part of the program.”  Ghazanfar Sukkurwala asserted that this inevitable unsustainable spending should be thought of as “an investment, rather than a charity” that will deliver substantial long-term benefits to donors and recipients that are not always immediately apparent on a balance sheet.

While recognizing these challenges, Mark Sedra of CIGI warned that implementing reforms with little consideration of financial sustainability risks creating “external dependencies” , rentier security sectors, rather than “self-reliant” institutions as prescribed by the SSR model. Illustrating the dangers of such an approach, Michael Brzoska of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy in the University of Hamburg stated: “Donors are in danger of repeating a mistake almost universally made by colonial powers (one of the many) who left newly emerging states with well organized (except in the Belgian case) but very expensive military sectors. Unsurprisingly, we had a large number of military dictatorships within a short time after independence.”

e-CONFERENCE SUMMARY - DAY 5 (part three)

Local Ownership

Local ownership, the dominant theme for the entire e-Conference, re-emerged in the Day 5 discussion. Several participants noted the link between sustainability and local ownership, arguing that reform sustainability will only be achieved if local stakeholders drive reforms. Jennifer Salahub of the North-South Institute, supported this contention, but asked a seemingly simple, yet difficult to answer question, “which locals” should be engaged? She then touched on the importance of creating entry points for the participation of marginalized groups in the process: “ There may need to be a role for donors and international civil society to push local authorities to create space for marginalized groups to participate in the reform process .” Wolf E. Poulet, an SSR Consultant at the Result Group Corp, after recognizing the critical nature of local ownership and the futility of donor-driven approaches, suggested that donors should even consider engaging “losers and spoilers” in order to foster a genuinely inclusive process.